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Introduction
The hostile $117 billion corporate takeover of Qualcomm, a
California semiconductor manufacturer and leader in 5G technology, by
Broadcom came to an abnormally abrupt end in March of 2018. 1 While
mergers and acquisitions often break down in today’s business climate, it is
abnormal for the President of the United States to block what would have
been the largest tech merger to date. 2 Though Broadcom publicly
announced plans to redomicile in the United States, it was not enough to
evade government scrutiny because its parent company, Avago, was based
in Singapore. 3 In November 2017, Qualcomm directors rejected Broadcom’s
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B.B.A. 2017, University of San Diego. This paper was presented at the 2019 Annual
Conference of the Pacific Southwest Academy of Legal Studies in Business. This Article
was originally submitted in Spring of 2019; it should be noted that the state of CFIUS
oversight is active and expanding.
1 See Shravanth Vijayakumar et al., Timeline: Broadcom-Qualcomm Saga Comes to an Abrupt
End, REUTERS: BUSINESS NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usqualcomm-m-a-broadcom-timeline/timeline-broadcom-qualcomm-saga-comes-to-anabrupt-end-idUSKCN1GQ22N.
2 Id.
3 Hence the Broadcom’s NASDAQ ticker symbol of AVGO. See YAHOO FINANCE,
https://finance.yahoo.com (search “AVGO”). Broadcom is a semiconductor firm that
sells its chips to the CFIUS repeat-player Huawei. See also Yuan Gao & Grant Clark, How
Fear of Huawei Killed $117 Billion Broadcom Deal, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-13/how- china-s-huawei-killed117-billion-broadcom-deal-quicktake. Broadcom has since completed its redomicile to
the United States and is now headquartered in San Jose, California. See also Yashaswini
Swamynathan, Broadcom Completes Move to U.S. from Singapore, REUTERS: BUSINESS NEWS
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-broadcom-domicile/broadcomcompletes-move-to-u-s-from-singapore-idUSKCN1HB34G. This was a move that
Broadcom says the Committee required as a condition for their approval on an earlier
deal with Brocade Communications Systems. See also David McLaughlin, Trump Blocks
Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm on Security Risks, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-12/trump-issues-order-to-blockbroadcom-s-takeover- of-qualcomm-jeoszwnt. Nevertheless, CFIUS faulted Broadcom
for inadequate notice of their now accelerated plan to relocate. See also Letter from Amin
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unsolicited $103 billion acquisition offer. 4
After months of highly public discussions between the two rival
semiconductor firms, the acquisition turned hostile when Broadcom
issued a tender offer to Qualcomm shareholders at a premium above the
stock price in an attempt to acquire control of Qualcomm board seats. 5
On March 4, 2017, just two days before the scheduled shareholder meeting
to determine the outcome of the tender offer, the United States
government interjected. 6 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) reviewed the proposed acquisition and halted the
takeover attempt by releasing an order stating that it had identified national
security risks that required a full investigation. 7 On March 11, the CFIUS
Committee concluded its investigation and recommended that the
President of the United States reject the deal. 8 President Trump
acquiesced to the CFIUS Committee’s recommendation and blocked the
takeover by Executive Order the following day. 9 This marked the fifth
transaction to be formally terminated through the abstruse CFIUS process
that informally derails countless deals. 10 Overnight, CFIUS made headlines
in not only the local San Diego Tribune, 11 but also the Wall Street Journal, the

N. Mir, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Investment Sec., Dep’t of the Treasury, to Mark Plotkin,
Covington and Burling LLP, and Theodore Kassinger, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP (Mar.
11, 2018), (accessible at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/804328/000110465
918016576/a18-7296_12ex99d1.htm).
4 See Vijayakumar, supra note 1.
5 The takeover offer was temporarily delayed by Qualcomm making a tender offer on
another semiconductor company that would have increased the number of shares thus
increasing the necessary expense for Broadcom to purchase a controlling quantity. See
Vijayakumar, supra note 1.
6 See Qualcomm Inc., Current Rep., (Form 8-K) (Mar. 5, 2018) (attaching March 4, 2018
Interim Order from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States as
Exhibit 99.1) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/804328/00011046591801482
3/a18-7296_4ex99d1.htm.
7 See Sanders, infra note 12.
8 See Letter from Amin N. Mir to Mark Plotkin and Theodore Kassinger, supra note 3.
9 See McLaughlin, supra note 3.
10 This unprecedented outcome blocking a hostile takeover attempt and disagreed deal
“underscores the tough stance the Trump administration is taking on foreign takeovers
of U.S. technology firms.” See McLaughlin, supra note 3.
11 See Mike Freeman, President Trump Blocks Broadcom’s Bid to Acquire Qualcomm, SAN DIEGO
UNION UNION- TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
business/technology/sd-fi-broadcom-relocation-20180312-story.html.
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New York Times, the Washington Post, Forbes, FoxNews, CNN, and law firm
newsletters to clients across the globe. 12
Headlines like those following the Qualcomm-Broadcom breakdown
will increase in regularity due to an expansion of the Legislature permitting
executive intervention of foreign transactions. CFIUS is the interagency
regulatory body that facilitates an executive review of foreign mergers and
acquisitions involving a United States entity to stop or reverse deals with
national security implications. 13 When international transactions are
planned or already completed without prior CFIUS approval, the CFIUS
Committee investigates the potential impact on national security and
recommends to the President of the United States either approval,
implementation of mitigating measures, or full rejection of the deal. 14
Historically, the large majority of foreign investment in the United
States has been unregulated and the process of review itself has been
underregulated. Recently, in August of 2018, Congress passed the Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) which
exponentially expands the scope of CFIUS jurisdiction and the CFIUS
review process. 15 The President signed this legislative overhaul into law
and FIRRMA now awaits full implementation. 16 CFIUS expansion will
negatively impact economic sectors, both domestic and international, if
not adequately regulated. Additionally, FIRRMA does not do enough to
protect the United States in today’s global economy. FIRRMA overextends
With the Qualcomm-Broadcom takeover in mainstream discussion, CFIUS entered
headlines across the globe. See Kate O’Keeffe, Trump Orders Broadcom to Cease Attempt to
Buy Qualcomm, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-lettercfius-suggests-it-may-soon-recommend-against-broadcom-bid-for-qualcomm-15208698
67; Chris Sanders, U.S. Sees National Security Risk from Broadcom’s Qualcomm Deal, REUTERS:
BUSINESS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), https://cn.reuters.com/article/qualcomm-mabroadcom-idCNL4N1QO4GF; cHALo, Donald Trump Bloquea la Posible Compra de Qualcom
por Parte de Broadcom: “Es Un Riesgo a la Seguridad Nacional,” Gonzalo Varas (Mar. 3, 2018),
https://www.gonzalovaras.cl/2018/03/13/donald-trump-bloquea-la-posible-comprade-qualcomm-por- parte-de-broadcom-es-un-riesgo-a-la-seguridad-nacional/.
13 See Vijayakumar, supra note 1.
14 See Process Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (November 20, 2018, 4:22 PM),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreigninvestment/Pages/cfius-overview.aspx.
15 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 1701-1746 as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2019 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565).
16 See The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-onforeign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
12
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CFIUS and will likely hinder necessary investment that funds necessary
innovation. Further, FIRRMA falls short by not addressing threats from
both start-up technology transfer by hiring American minds and
cumulative passive foreign ownership. FIRRMA’s failures to adequately
address these issues are important because CFIUS serves a critical role in
managing international economic tension and preserving national security,
a balancing act that is now more critical than ever in the age of
cyberwarfare, economic dependence, global citizenship, and artificial
intelligence.
This Comment advocates for a more holistic approach to ensure
national security interests are preserved while the United States remains
open to receiving any potential benefit from inbound foreign direct
investment. Part I of this Comment provides background on inbound
foreign direct investment, the history of CFIUS, the old review process
under the previous legislative framework, and the newly enacted changes to
CFIUS review under FIRRMA. Part II analyzes the increased scope of
CFIUS jurisdiction and argues that the new regime is insufficient to
achieve the needed balance between the interdependent economic and
national security consideration. Some changes are inefficient due to
overbreadth; other changes fail to successfully capture posed threats to
national security that ought to be addressed by CFIUS. Finally, in Part III,
this Comment poses a solution to the issues discussed in Part II. To reduce
underregulated exposures of national security interests and free the
market from an inefficiently designed regulation structure, Part III
recommends amendments to FIRRMA, additions to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation, and specific federal regulations
FIRRMA allows the Committee to implement.
I. Background
This background section lays the foundation for later analysis by
defining and connecting the key concepts of inbound foreign direct
investment and national security, the origin of CFIUS, the regime as it
functioned under the Foreign Investment and National Securities Act of
2007 (FINSA) prior to 2018, 17 and the key changes that accompany the
17 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat.
246 as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019 (amending Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2170 (2006) (later amended by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act

2019]

CFIUS REFORM: FEAR AND FIRRMA

81

new CFIUS regime under FIRRMA. First, it will discuss foreign direct
investment, the definition of FDI, its impact on the economy, and the
relation between this source of funding and national security. Second, it
will address the history of CFIUS, its origin, and path to codification.
Third, it examines the FINSA period as reflected by triggering transaction
guidelines, its review process, and the Fifth Amendment challenge in Ralls
Corp v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. 18 Fourth, it
introduces FIRRMA by discussing the reasons for reform and noting the
changes in scope, procedure, and reviewability of decisions.
A. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Foreign direct investment occurs when an investor, either a company
or an individual, domiciled in one country, invests capital into a company,
or other projects, in another country. 19 For example, if a company owned
by Chinese nationals purchases an American business, the investment
would be considered FDI. Traditionally, inbound funds trigger FDI status
when the foreign investor acquires ownership or control of over 10% of
the domestic company. 20 The United States has long held an Open
Investment policy that welcomes FDI due to its economic benefits to the
inbound nation. 21 This policy has encouraged continued foreign
investment by assuring investors around the world that the administration
in power will remain committed to the general principal that all investors
should be treated in a fair and equitable manner under the law. 22

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2173–2208 (to be codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 4565 ))).
18 Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296,
315–16 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19 See Key Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Terms and Concepts, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://www.selectusa.gov/fdi-data-glossary (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
20 Regardless of whether the foreign investor is an individual or a business entity. See id.
21 See Statement on the United States Commitment to Open Investment Policy (June 20,
2011) in BUDGET AND PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS, COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 201100457 (2011).
22 Id.
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i. FDI’s Effect on the American Economy
The United States is consistently the top ranked destination for FDI
and it arguably plays a vital role in American economic prosperity. 23 In
2016 alone, the United States received FDI of $365.7 billion as a result of
acquisitions of U.S. companies. 24 Additionally, foreign-owned factories in
the United States are responsible for nearly one-fifth of all U.S. exports. 25
This influx of capital allows some companies to grow and develop new
product lines. For example, inbound foreign direct investment by BMW
enabled a $750 million expansion of the BMW America plant in South
Carolina. 26 While the net benefit of FDI in certain contexts is debated by
scholars, FDI provides over 12 million jobs in the United States, which is
over 8.5% of the labor force. 27
ii. FDI and National Security
Increases in FDI, however, also produce national security concerns,
particularly in the areas of trade disputes and intellectual property
See Statement on the 2017 National Security Strategy (Dec. 18, 2017) in BUDGET AND
PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS, COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 201700917
(2017).
24 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2176 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565); see also Foreign Direct
Investment in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/
news/fact-sheets/2017/10/foreign-direct-investment-united-states (reporting that
majority-owned U.S. affiliates of foreign entities served as a “catalyst for research and
development, spending $56.7 billion in 2015 on R&D and accounting for 15.8 percent
of the U.S. total expenditure on R&D by businesses”).
25 Deborah Orr, The Largest Foreign Investments in The U.S., FORBES (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/2008/04/10/foreign-investment-stocks-2000global08-bizcx_do_0410investments.html#1c27adfe2b1f (“Foreign-owned factories based in the
U.S. do more than cater to the huge American market; these businesses also export nearly
$170 billion worth of goods made in this country. That’s nearly a fifth of all U.S.
exports.”).
26 Id.
27 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. § 1702 (a)(1) (2018), (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565);
Foreign Direct Investment: Driving Global Competitiveness and Innovation, U.S. DEP’T OF COM.
(June 9, 2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2017/06/foreign-directinvestment-driving-global-competitiveness- and-innovation. But see, e.g., Erika George &
Elizabeth Thomas, Bringing Human Rights into Bilateral Investment Treaties: South Africa and a
23
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transfers. If the economy becomes too dependent on FDI, foreign
countries can use the threat of decreased FDI as bargaining leverage in
international negotiations. 28 The possibility of foreign influence and
control of the economy, especially in sectors pertaining to critical
infrastructure, has fueled arguments opposing unregulated FDI on the
basis of national security concerns. 29 For example, the QualcommBroadcom transaction threatened to grant a foreign company significant
influence over the supply of semiconductors, a key component found in
all cellphones, computers, vehicles, missiles, and radar systems. 30
Additionally, foreign ownership of American businesses can enable the
theft of American technology through the transfer of intellectual
property. 31 Foreign ownership of intellectual property often increases the
likelihood of trade secret misappropriation because some foreign
government policies force disclosure while other foreign legal regimes do
not penalize unauthorized intrusions into computer networks. 32 Once
owned by a foreign entity, the jurisdictional capacity of the United States
to restrict access is limited; protecting the IP from being stolen or reaching
U.S. adversaries becomes a complex matter of international politics. 33 In
Different Approach to International Investment Disputes, 27 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 404, 430–32 (2018) (noting issues, particularly human rights issues, that can be
involved with foreign direct investment).
28 See Mary Ellen Stanley, From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment, 40
BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 1033, 1035–36 (2015).
29 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-494, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS EVOLVING
NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2018).
30 Josh Horwitz, Why the Semiconductor Is Suddenly at the Heart of US-China Tech Tensions,
(July
24,
2018),
https://qz.com/1335801/us-china-tech-why-theQUARTZ
semiconductor-is-suddenly-at-the-heart-of- us-china-tensions/ (“[A] small but critical
portion of the semiconductor industry has specific applications in the defense sector, for
use in things like missiles and radars. Mastery of the semiconductor technology can help
ensure that a country’s military technology remains at the cutting edge.”).
31 See Stanley, supra note 28, at 1037 (quoting Matthew Crosston, Soft Spying: Leveraging
Globalization as Proxy Military Rivalry, 28 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE &
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 105, 109 (2014)).
32 See DEPT. OF JUST., REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE DEFEND TRADE
SECRETS ACT (2018) (“Some foreign countries’ practices and policies, including
evidentiary requirements in trade secrets litigation and mandatory technology transfer,
put valuable trade secrets at risk of exposure.”).
33 See, e.g., James Andrew Lewis, Put China’s Intellectual Property Theft in a Larger Context, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.csis.org/analysis/putchinas- intellectual-property-theft-larger-context (clarifying that international trade and
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the Qualcomm example, in addition to the economic implications of supply
control, the foreign access to intellectual property found in semiconductor
manufacturing would expose the United States to heightened threats of
cyberwarfare. 34 As a result, the interagency body, the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (the “CFIUS” 35) reviews
transactions involving FDI to assess the impact on the U.S. economy and
national security. 36
B. The Origins of CFIUS
Before elaborating on the inadequacy of the CFIUS regime, it must be
noted that CFIUS is not new. FIRRMA did not create a new body for
executive review; it expanded the scope of an existing and authorized
mechanism. This section gives an overview of the origins of CFIUS, its
unique creation, initial intent, and ultimate codification for the purpose of
acknowledging the legitimacy of the authority delegated to CFIUS.
Inbound foreign direct investment in the United States increased in
the 1970s due to the depreciation of the dollar relative to other
currencies. 37 This relative depreciation made it extremely cost efficient for
foreign investors to purchase ownership in American companies. At this
time, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
gained enormous surpluses from its oil embargo on the United States and
intellectual property protection policies are pressing areas of potential reform, and, while
alliances and treaties fill the political landscape, there is no comprehensive agreement nor
is there is there an enforcement system to ensure compliance short of diplomatic
pressure and political sanctions).
34 See Jim Lundy, Cyberwar and 5G: The U.S. and Its Allies Take on Huawei, ARAGON RES.
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://aragonresearch.com/cyberwar-and-5g-united-states-and-alliestake-on-huawei/.
35 See David McLaughlin & Kristy Westgard, Meet (and Pronounce) CFIUS, U.S. Watchdog on
Deals: QuickTake, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2018, 1:47PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-03-13/meet-and-pronounce-cfius-u-s-watchdog-on-deals-quicktake
(stating that CFIUS is pronounced SIFF-ee-yus).
36 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2018) [hereinafter Jackson CRS Report
2018].
37 Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security
or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 588–89 (2007) (“In the 1970s, partly as a
result of ‘the depreciation of the dollar against other major foreign currencies,’ foreign
investment continued to pour into the United States . . . . [The FIRRMA mandated review
concluded] that the United States lacked a coherent mechanism to monitor foreign
investment.”).
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the coinciding U.S. energy crisis. 38 Concerned over this trend, Congress
passed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 which reported the
current state of FDI monitoring as inadequate. 39 Fueled by the Study Act
report, legislators feared OPEC surpluses would be used to buy critical
U.S. assets for political reasons. 40 In a bid to ease legislators’ concerns over
OPEC investment, President Ford signed Executive Order 11858
establishing CFIUS in 1975. 41
Congress then addressed the already operational CFIUS in an
amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (the “DPA”) which
expressly granted the Executive branch the authority to review certain
See, e.g., Robert D. Lifset, A New Understanding of the American Energy Crisis of the 1970s,
39 HIST. SOC. RES., HISTORISCHE SOZIALFORSCHUNG 22 (2014).
39 Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000)); see Joanna Rubin Travalini, Symposium on the Globalization of Private
Equity: Changes in the International Market and the Impact on Private Equity Investment: Comment:
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a Balance Between National Economy
Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 783 (2009) (“The Study
Act, through its mandated review of U.S. foreign investment policy, led the government
to conclude that ‘the United States did not maintain an adequate mechanism for
monitoring foreign investments.’”) (quoting Paul I. Djurisic, The Exon-Florio Amendment:
National Security Legislation Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 179,
180 (1991)).
40 See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 1, n.2; Kenneth Y. Hui, National Security
Review of Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Companies in China and the
United States (2009) (unpublished Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student
Conference Papers) (on file with Cornell University Law school) (available at
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/34); Xingxing Li, National Security Review in
Foreign Investments: A Comparative and Critical Assessment on China and U.S. Laws and Practices,
13 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 255, 261 (2016) (“To retrace the history of CFIUS, President
Gerald Ford established CFIUS in 1975, following the energy crisis from 1972 through
1975. In the 1970s, it was of concern that . . . [OPEC] would use the surpluses gained in
the oil embargo on the United States to buy up critical US assets.”).
41 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. 13456
(2008). Initially, review of investments that “might have major implications for United
States national interests” constituted only one of the five responsibilities given to the
Committee. Id. The five responsibilities of the committee were to (1) arrange for the
preparation of analyses of trends and significant developments in foreign investments in
the United States; (2) provide guidance on arrangements with foreign governments for
advance consultations on prospective major foreign governmental investments in the
United States; (3) review investments in the United States which, in the judgment of the
Committee, might have major implications for United States national interests; (4)
consider proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to foreign investment as
may appear necessary; and (5) as the need arises, the Committee shall submit
recommendations and analyses to the National Security Council and to the Economic
Policy Board.
38
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mergers and acquisitions for national security purposes. 42 This power has
been delegated, by Executive Order, to CFIUS. 43 In 1988, Japanese
companies were the leader in FDI in the United States and primarily
invested into high-technology industries. 44 Unease over rise in foreign
investment and Japanese ownership led Congress to change Section 721
through the “Exon-Florio” Provision. 45 Notably, this legislation eliminated

Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1950) (currently 50 U.S.C. §
4565 (2019)).
43 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. 13456
(2008). The division of responsibility is fundamental in the United States through the
separation of powers. The Executive Branch has the authority to address matters of
national security, including when such matters derive from economic activity. For a full
discussion of authorities given to the President aside form CFIUS (including the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (EAA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Federal Acquisition
Regulations System (FARS)), see Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National
Security Risk in an Open Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J., no. 2, 2018, at 6–14. As Commander in Chief, the President
has the constitutionally derived authority to classify information and restrict access to
that information. See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“The President,
after all, is the ‘Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.’ His
authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security . . .
flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President, and exists
quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” [citation omitted]). To ensure the
protection of classified information, the Defense Security Service has been tasked with
the responsibility of oversight as outlined in the National Industry Security Program.
Exec. Order No. 12,885, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,863 (Dec. 16, 1993), amending Exec. Order No.
12,829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,479 (Jan. 6, 1993). But when a transaction or investment does not
involve classified information, the authority is assigned by the Constitution to Congress
through the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the
power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States”).
44 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/NSIAD-96-12, FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO & RELATED AMENDMENTS 6, 36 (1995); JAMES K.
JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., RS22197, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL SECURITY TEST
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 2 (2006) [hereinafter Jackson CRS Report 2006]; Mostaghel,
supra note 31, at 590–93.
45 Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, 100 Pub. L. No. 418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1425-26 (1988) (amending Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2158-2169 (1982), by adding Section 721, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988)). The
proposed wording of the reform would have expanded CFIUS review to investments
affecting “national security and essential commerce” but the Reagan Administration
rejected the term “essential commerce.” At this time in American history, the outward
dedication to open international markets was of significant importance and CFIUS was
ripe to become the covert vehicle for policy implementation. In the end, Congress
strengthened the President’s hand in conducting foreign investment policy, but decrease
42
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any discrepancy regarding whether the President needed to declare a state
of emergency to block a problematic transaction by giving the President
explicit authority to take action whenever he considered it “appropriate”
to do so, as long as he clarified that (1) other laws inadequately address the
transaction risks and (2) a credible threat to national security exists. 46
A series of transactions involving foreign government entities, as
opposed to foreign private entities, once again ignited political pressure to
further strengthen CFIUS. 47 An example of this trend includes the French
government owned Thompson C.S.F.’s offer to purchase LVT
Corporation’s Missile Division which drew significant congressional
attention. 48 In 1992, legislators amended Exon-Florio through the “Byrd
Amendment.” 49 Attempting to signal the importance of transaction
review, Congress used the “Byrd Amendment” to require CFIUS to
investigate if the acquiring party was “controlled by or acting on behalf
of a foreign government.” 50 Despite these amendments however, critics
of the legislation viewed the United States as still “dangerously defenseless
against an onslaught of strategic foreign buyouts and acquisitions.” 51
C. 2007 Legislation: CFIUS under FINSA
In 2006, the Alcatel-Lucent acquisition and Dubai Port’s World deal
led to a renewed interest in CFIUS. 52 The backlash from these two highly
its own influence to reassure the markets that investment transactions would be generally
untouched by political interference. See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 5–7.
46 Jackson CRS Report 2006, supra note 44, at 2–3.
47 See generally Kristy E. Young, Note, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
and the Foreign Investment and National Securities Act of 2007: A Delicate Balancing Act That
Needs Revision, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 43, 47 (2008).
48 See Mostaghel, supra note 37, at 597–600.
49 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106
Stat. 2315, 2464–65 (1992).
50 Id.; 138 CONG. REC. S14039 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1992) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (hoping
that amendment provides “signal to the administration of the importance that the
Congress places on this issue”).
51 See, e.g., Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment
Operations: How Much is Enough?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 417, 431 (1994).
52 See The DP World Controversy and the Ongoing Vulnerability of U.S. Seaports: Hearing on The
National Security Implications of the Dubai Ports World Deal to Take Over Management of U.S.
Ports Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 10–14, 133–139 (2006) (statement
of Stephen E. Flynn, PhD., Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (Ret.), Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Senior Fellow in National Security Studies) (available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg32987/pdf/CHRG- 109hhrg32987.pdf). CFIUS and
President Bush approved the French acquisition of Lucent Technologies but required the
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broadcast deals urged Congress to pass FINSA. 53 FINSA reformed the
CFIUS process and established the decade long regime that serves as a
baseline for later analysis of the changes implemented in FIRRMA. 54 This
section will examine the FINSA guidelines for CFIUS review relating to
overall structure and purpose. Next, the procedural process of review
under FINSA is outlined by defining the initial triggering criteria, the
Committee review period, and the role of the President. Finally, FINSA’s
bar on judicial review of CFIUS decisions is demonstrated through Ralls
Corp.
i. Guidelines for CFIUS Review
FINSA defined the type of transaction the Committee should review,
the distribution of Committee power, and the goal of the review process
as understood by Congress at the time they enacted the legislation.
Covered transactions were defined as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover
. . . by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of
any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 55
Although FINSA did not explicitly define ‘control,’ the Treasury
Department states that control is not determined by a numeric benchmark,
but rather by a subjective determination of power, direct or indirect,
exercised or exercisable, to direct or decide matters affecting the entity. 56
foreign acquirer to agree to a Special Security Arrangement that restricted its access to
some work done by the target’s research arm, Bell Labs. Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra
note 36, at 8. Outrage surrounded the state-owned Dubai World Exports’ announcement
that it intended to purchase controlling management interest in six U.S. ports, the
criticism becoming so fierce that DP decided to “transfer” its interest to an undisclosed
American Company. See David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/underpressure-dubai-company-drops-port-deal.html.
53 See Judy Wang, Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS: A New Look at Foreign Direct Investments to the US,
54 COLUM. TRANSNAT’L L. BULL. 30, 36 (2016).
54 The greatest impact felt by the few companies whose transactions did go under review
was a dip in stock price due to investors’ negative perception of government
investigations and the possibility of intervention. See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note
36, at 12 (citing anecdotal evidence that CFIUS review “can negatively affect the firm’s
stock price”).
55 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4) (2018).
56 Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 17. In comparison, the term ‘control’ as used
in the Corporate Law context often means the capacity to choose directors and possible
influence or dominate the board. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., “Control” in Coṛporate Law, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1212 (1958).
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Transactions were not considered covered under CFIUS jurisdiction if
they were undertaken “solely for the purpose of investment” with no
intent to direct business operations, meaning they resulted in the ownership
of less than 10% of the voting securities or were undertaken by a financial
investment institution through “ordinary course of business for its own
account.” 57 For example, consider a passive investment by a foreign
national as a limited partner of an investment fund. If that fund has a
general partner who is not a foreign national, then when that fund
purchases a shareholder interest in a domestic corporation, the “control”
required for CFIUS jurisdiction would not likely be satisfied. 58
No Single Agency Holds Authority
CFIUS is a regulatory committee of the Executive Branch with
representatives from multiple government agencies. 59 The interagency
Committee is headed by the Secretary of the Treasury; the Committee
includes permanent members identified as the heads of nine departments;
however, other departments and advisors participate on a case-by-case
basis when necessary. 60 The Treasury Department has been unsuccessful
31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (2008); Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 15.
Typically, general partners are involved with day-to-day operations and decisions of the
business; in contrast, limited partners cannot act in the management role reserved for
general partners without exposing them to the liability risks of the general partner. See
ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
409–10 (2d ed. 2014).
59 See Composition of CFIUS, THE U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 1, 2010, 8:08
AM),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/
Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
60 The CFIUS members include the heads of the following: (1) Department of the
Treasury (chair); (2) Department of Justice; (3) Department of Homeland Security; (4)
Department of Commerce; (5) Department of Defense; (6) Department of State; (7)
Department of Energy; (8) Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; (9) Office of Science
& Technology Policy. The following offices also observe and, as appropriate, participate
in CFIUS’ activities: (1) Office of Management & Budget; (2) Council of Economic
Advisors; (3) National Security Council; (4) National Economic Council; (5) Homeland
Security Council. The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Labor are
non-voting, ex-officio members of CFIUS with roles as defined by statute and regulation.
Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.
treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfiusmembers.aspx (reformatted); see also Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758
F.3d 296, 302 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The President also appointed the United States Trade
Representative and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
CFIUS and directed several White House officials, among others, to participate as
observers.”).
57
58
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in implementing an organizational structure to effectively coordinate the
synchronization of these agencies’ efforts thus far. 61
The Purpose: National Security
The predominant goal of the CFIUS body has always been to
investigate business transactions involving foreign investment that could
impair national security. 62 FINSA broadened the scope of economic
activity subject to CFIUS review by stating that “the term ‘national
security’ shall be construed so as to include those issues relating to
‘homeland security’, including its application to critical infrastructure.” 63
According to the Committee, “[n]ational security risk is a function of the
interaction between threat and vulnerability, and the potential

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-494, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS EVOLVING
NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 13 (2018)
(“CFIUS has experienced an increase in workload in recent years, but Treasury, as CFIUS
lead, has not coordinated member agency efforts to better understand staffing levels
needed to complete core committee functions.”).
62 See The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-onforeign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
63 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat.
246 (amending Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §
2170 (2006)); Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 15. The wording and timing of
this change align with the legislation passed in response to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. See Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title X, § 1014, (2001); 42
U.S.C. § 5195(c)(e) (1994); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002) (6 U.S.C. § 101). Thus, determining the current list of included sectors
remained the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS
determined sectors as of 2007 are: (1) Agriculture and Food; (2) Defense Industrial Base;
(3) Energy; (4) Public Health and Healthcare; (5) National Monuments and Icons; (6)
Banking and Finance; (7) Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems; (8) Chemical;
(9) Commercial Facilities; (10) Dams; (11) Emergency Services; (12) Commercial Nuclear
Reactors, Materials, and Waste; (13) Information Technology; (14) Telecommunications;
(15) Postal and Shipping; (16) Transportation Systems; and (17) Government Facilities.
See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 16 n.42. The 2013 Presidential Policy
Directive reconfirmed the responsibility of DHS and other agencies resulting in an
updated list of sixteen sectors deemed critical to U.S. infrastructure. See Directive on
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 201300092
(Feb. 12, 2013). The 2013 list added critical manufacturing, consolidated multiple prior
categories into ‘communications,’ and eliminated the national monuments and icons
sector. See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 16.
61
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consequences of that interaction for U.S. national security.” 64 A blatant
example of a deal featuring this type of national security risk is the 2016
Chinese Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund’s attempted acquisition of
Aixtron, a German-based technology with assets in the United States. 65
President Obama blocked this deal because it involved semiconductors,
partially produced in California, that were used in foreign missile defense
systems. 66
ii. CFIUS Review Process
Retro-active Review, Pro-active Application, SEC Filings
CFIUS may initiate a review of a covered transaction sua ponte. 67 SEC
filings and press releases can draw the Committee’s unsolicited attention
and lead to a review proceeding. Alternatively, either party to a covered
transaction could initiate a CFIUS review by providing written notice to
the Committee. 68 Under FINSA, parties never needed to file for CFIUS;
they only strategically exercised the option to file for CFIUS review
voluntarily. 69 If parties chose to file, they hoped to avoid the otherwise
lingering risk that CFIUS would be able to retroactively investigate and
undo the deal. 70 There has never been a statute of limitations imposed on
CFIUS review; the Committee can investigate before the covered
transaction is completed, while the covered transaction is pending, or
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Letter to Parties Re: CFIUS Case 18-036:
Broadcom Limited (Singapore)/Qualcomm Incorporated (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/804328/000110465918015036/a18-7296_7
ex99d1.htm.
65 See e.g., Maria Sheahan, China’s Fujian Drops Aixtron Bid After Obama Blocks Deal,
REUTERS, (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:27AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-aixtron-m-afujian/chinas-fujian-drops-aixtron-bid- after-obama-blocks-deal-idUSKBN13X16H.
66 Id. Nevertheless, the denied approval was censured as the “politicization” of
commerce. Id.
67 See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 248; Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d
296, 302 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
68 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat.
247; 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2008).
69 See 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (2008) (“A party or parties to a proposed or completed
transaction may file a voluntary notice of the transaction with the Committee.”).
70 See e.g., Christopher Kimball & Kevin King, M&A Guide to CFIUS: How the Review
Process Can Impact Your Transaction, COOLEY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cooley.com/
news/insight/2017/2017-10-06-ma-guide-to-cfius-article-1-of-4.
64
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retro-actively after the covered transaction closed. 71 Historically, parties
could only obtain a legal “safe harbor” and estop CFIUS from potentially
reversing the agreement if they chose to voluntarily apply for CFIUS
review and ultimately received a determination that no national security
risk remained unresolved. 72 At any stage of the transaction, the decision
to apply for review by filing voluntary notice involves risk. For example,
in one of five transactions blocked by the President, the Ralls Corp
windfarm purchase, the parties strategically filed a delayed notice. 73 Here,
CFIUS did not review the purchase until five months after the transaction
concluded but still retroactively required the divestment of the acquired
assets. 74
Review Committee
Under the FINSA regime, the review process lasted thirty days during
which the Committee considered eleven factors to determine if and how
the proposed or completed transaction affected national security. 75 If risks
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 248; Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 302.
72 See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 8 (citing 50 U.S.C § 4565(b)(1)(D)).
73 See Younglai, infra note 84.
74 See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 2012, 2 (2013); Sinead Carew & Jessica Wohl, Huawei Backs
Away from 3Leaf Acquisition, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2011, 11:04 AM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-huawei-3leaf/huawei-backs-away-from-3leaf-acquisitionidUSTRE71I38920110219.
75 The eleven factors are outlined as follows:
For purposes of this section, the President or the President’s designee
may, taking into account the requirements of national security,
consider—
(1) domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to
meet national defense requirements, including the
availability of human resources, products, technology,
materials, and other supplies and services, the control
of domestic industries and commercial activity by
foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity
of the United States to meet the requirements of
national security,
(3) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or
technology to any country . . .
(4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
71
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were not resolved after the thirty-day review period, then a forty-five day
National Security Investigation followed. 76 At the commencement of the
forty-five day formal investigation, the Committee sent a recommendation

transaction on United States international technological
leadership in areas affecting United States national
security;
(5) the potential national security-related effects on United
States critical infrastructure, including major energy
assets;
(6) the potential national security-related effects on United
States critical technologies;
(7) whether the covered transaction is a foreign
government-controlled transaction, as determined
under subsection (b)(1)(B);
(8) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to
transactions requiring an investigation under subsection
(b)(1)(B), a review of the current assessment of-(9) the adherence of the subject country to
nonproliferation control regimes, including treaties and
multilateral supply guidelines, which shall draw on, but
not be limited to, the annual report on “Adherence to
and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”
required by section 403 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act [22 USCS § 2593a];
(A) the relationship of such country with the United
States, specifically on its record on cooperating
in counter-terrorism efforts, which shall draw on,
but not be limited to, the report of the President
to Congress under section 7120 of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 [unclassified]; and
(B) the potential for transshipment or diversion of
technologies with military applications, including
an analysis of national export control laws and
regulations;
(C) the long-term projection of United States
requirements for sources of energy and other
critical resources and material; and
(10) such other factors as the President or the Committee
may determine to be appropriate, generally or in
connection with a specific review or investigation.
Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(f) (2019)).
76 See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 11.
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letter to the President relaying the Committee’s approval, rejection, or
suggested contingent mitigation measures. 77
President Decision
This structure gave the President fifteen days to make a final
determination in the form of a Presidential Order. 78 FINSA added criteria
for the President to take into consideration and ensured that the President
“is under no obligation to follow the recommendation of the Committee
to suspend or prohibit an investment.” 79 Nevertheless, before blocking a
transaction, the President still needed to determine that (1) other laws did
not sufficiently protect the country, and (2) that there existed “credible
evidence” that if the transaction were to be executed, it would impair
national security. 80 For example, if the deal would otherwise be blocked by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) due to antitrust concerns, then there is no reason
CFIUS must intervene and the first requirement would not be met. The
second requirement of credible evidence that national security would
suffer is more subjective. An example of a deal that may not meet this
criteria is the foreign sale of a company like Coca-Cola or Levi’s; though
loved American brands, their foreign ownership would not likely create
realistically foreseeable threats to matters of national security.
iii. Judicial Challenge
Since its establishment, CFIUS’ intentional opacity has created
controversy. 81 FINSA furnished Congress with confidential briefings on
covered transactions and unclassified reports were released by the
Committee, but this did not increase transparency to the parties involved

Id.
Id.
79 Id. at 13.
80 Id. at 5.
81 See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 1 (“Originally established by an Executive
Order of President Ford in 1975, the committee has operated until recently in relative
obscurity.”).
77
78
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or the general public. 82 The resulting discretion granted to the President is
“not be subject to judicial review.” 83
This limited transparency led to the only CFIUS court case to date:
Ralls Corporation brought suit constitutionally challenging President
Obama’s 2012 mandate that it divest an Oregon Windfarm Project for
alleged national security threats. 84 Though incorporated in Delaware, Ralls
Corporation’s owners were Chinese nationals, and thus their purchase of
four American LLCs with windfarm location in and around restricted
Navy airspace fell “within the ambit of the DPA.” 85 Ralls disputed the
constitutionality of the CFIUS orders on Fifth Amendment grounds
claiming a right to review and rebut evidence considered. 86 The court
determined that FIRRMA afforded no lack of reviewability to the CFIUS
Committee decision 87 and that the Presidential Order deprived Ralls of its
property interest while violating the due process clause. 88
Though the court clarified that “due process does not require
disclosure of classified information supporting official action,” the court
Id. at 10, 20.
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 256; Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 14.
84 See Rachel Younglai, Obama Blocks Chinese Wind Farms in Oregon Over Security, REUTERS
(Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-turbines/obama-blockschinese-wind-farms-in-oregon-over-security-idUSBRE88R19220120929.
Ralls
submitted a twenty-five-page notice of the transaction to CFIUS prompting a formal
thirty-day review that resulted in an Order Establishing Interim Mitigation Measures. The
CFIUS Order (with its amendments implemented three days into the Investigation
Period) mandates Ralls remove all items from the disputed site, cease all construction,
operation, and access on the site, and refrain from selling the site without prior CFIUS
notice and approval. The President timely released an Order on the matter prohibiting
the transaction and restricting Ralls future transactions involving the site. See Ralls Corp.
v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 305-06 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
85 See Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 301. Even after Ralls moved the Lower Ridge cite to reduce
conflict with low-level aircraft exercises at the Navy’s request, one of the target LLC’s
project sites remained in and around a U.S. Navy restricted airspace and bombing zone.
Id. at 304–05.
86 Id. at 302.
87 Id. at 311. The court determined that Ralls had acquired a property interest under state
law that did not contain a contingency element as to Presidential Veto. Id. at 316–17.
88 Citing the Supreme Court’s recognition of the “right to know the factual basis for the
action and the opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting that action,” the court ruled
in favor of Ralls Corp., although this favorable verdict ultimately had no effect on the
outcome of the transaction. Id. at 318–19.
82
83
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found that the President, or CFIUS acting on his behalf, had the duty to
make the unclassified materials used in his determination available to Ralls
and to provide Ralls the opportunity to dispute these materials as a matter
of due process right. 89 The holding did not require the administration to
disclose its reasoning for the determination. Nevertheless, this ruling is
highly criticized because the administration’s opinion on delicate foreign
policy issues can be revealed by the choice of documents left unclassified
and therefore able to be disclosed to parties. 90 Scholars point out that in
practice, this ruling is unlikely to expand transparency because there are
no legal requirements to limit which documents the government files as
classified. 91 Ralls Corp is unlikely to help future parties like Ralls because
beyond the disclosure of un-classified documents, which may become
increasingly limited in number, there is no judicial review of CFIUS
decisions on merits. 92
D. 2018 FIRRMA Legislation
In 2018, CFIUS endured its latest legislative overhaul. FIRRMA
tightened the oversight of FDI, a subtle but significant shift from the longproclaimed Open Investment policy. This section outlines the climate
surrounding the push for CFIUS reform, the reasons FIRRMA passed, and
the key changes the bill makes to the CFIUS regime. In Part II, these
changes are critiqued in light of the specific issues they seek to resolve.
FIRRMA is the embodiment of frustrations felt by the inbound and
Importantly, this opinion clarified that the President is under no obligation to disclose
his rationale on sensitive questions about the transaction related to national security. Id.
at 319–20.
90 See Christopher M. Fitzpatrick, Note, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS, The Courts, and
the Balance of Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1087, 1104 (2016). Ultimately, the
CFIUS unprecedently released 3,487 pages of unclassified documents and withheld only
two documents on the basis of executive privilege, and the decision by the Obama
administration to not fight the ruling’s legitimacy by appeal is often criticized. See Karlee
Weinmann, In Rare Move, CFIUS Hands Over Cache of Ralls Docs, LAW360 (Nov. 26, 2014),
https://www-law360-com.sandiego.idm.oclc.org/articles/599760/in-rare-move-cfiushands-over-cache-of-ralls-docs.
91 See Chang Liu, Note, Ralls v. CFIUS: The Long Time Coming Judicial Protection of Foreign
Investors’ Constitutional Rights Against Government’s National Security Review, 15 J. INT’L BUS. &
L. 361, 375 (2016).
92 Id. (“[I]f Ralls is given another chance to answer or persuade the President or the
Committee (which is unlikely), the White House and its officers still have the say at the
end of the day, and Ralls may very well have to bear the loss of its business decisions.”).
89
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outbound trade and investment relationship with China, 93 the military’s
dependence on private sector developed critical technology, and the
increase in global citizenship ideology among Americans. 94 The trade
deficit in China has crept to -$350 billion annually and Chinese venture
capital funds run rampant in Silicon Valley investing in critical
technology. 95 For example, Danhua Venture Capital (DHVC) is a Chinese
venture-capital firm based near Stanford University that the Chinese
government established and now funds. 96 These contributions are not
minute or rare. The Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx)
estimates that Chinese investors injected up to $4 billion into early-stage
venture deals in 2015. 97 In 2016, legislators started advocating for various
plans that would have strengthened the secretive CFIUS by allowing it to
scrutinize the surging inflow of investment from China. 98 By 2018,
Early stages of FIRRMA favored including a “blacklist” of countries that would receive
heightened scrutiny like China and Russia. See Jeff Farrah, Foreign Investment Bill and its
Impact on the VC and Startup Ecosystem, National VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION BLOG
(July 25, 2018), https://nvca.org/blog/foreign-investment-bill-impact-vc-startupecosystem/. Ultimately, with the prevalence of secondary transactions and continued
shifting of the political scene this strategy was abandoned in the final version of
FIRRMA.
94 The Lawfare Podcast: The Future of
CFIUS, LAWFARE (June 2, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-future-cfius (episode 317, min. 4,
comment by Ivan Schlager, a partner with Skadden Arps’ national security practice);
Yuliya Strizhakova et al., Branded Products as a Passport to Global Citizenship: Perspectives from
Developed and Developing Countries, 16 J. OF INT’L MKTG. 57, 57 (2008).
95 See United States Census Bureau, Foreign Trade: Trade in Goods with China, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2016;
Heather Somerville, China’s Penetration of Silicon Valley Creates Risks for Startups, REUTERS
(June 28, 2018, 7:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-techinvestinginsight/chinas-penetration-of-silicon-valley-creates-risks-for-startups-idUSKBN1JP08V.
96 Somerville, supra note 95.
97 Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental: China’s Technology
Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to
Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation, REORG (2017), https://new.reorgresearch.com/data/documents/20170928/59ccf7de70c2f.pdf (“Sinovation (formerly
known as China’s Innovation Works) provides a great example of an active Chinese
venture firm investing in the U.S.: it was founded in 2009, manages three funds of $1.2
billion in total capital and has invested in almost 300 startups--including 25 in artificial
intelligence.”).
98 See Kate O’Keeffe, Lawmakers Push for Tighter Scrutiny of Chinese Investment in U.S., WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-push-for-tighterscrutiny-of-chinese-investment-in-u-s-1487678403. The Foreign Investment and
Economic Security Act (FIESA) was introduced by Representative DeLauro on July 7,
2016. The bill proposed the expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction and the additional
consideration of the economic “net benefit” by CFIUS, but the bill never bolstered
93
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pressure from the Trump administration over Chinese and other foreign
investments exposed the limits of CFIUS scope under FINSA and
propelled legislators to move CFIUS reform forward by placing
FIRRMA in the “must pass” National Defense Authorization Act. 99 The
next era of CFIUS legislation received the President’s signature on August
13, 2018. 100
i. The Roots of FIRRMA
Unlike FINSA, FIRRMA did not arise out of a particular crisis. Rather,
it surfaced gradually from a growing sense of foreign policy frustration and
highly public transactions that highlighted CFIUS’ concerns. The initial
worries over suspect OPEC investment have been replaced by skepticism
over Chinese and Russian “economic espionage” as politically motivated

sufficient support. See H.R. 5665, 114th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2016). By October 18, 2017, a
bill was introduced to the Senate by Senators Grassley and Brown in the United States
Foreign Investment Review Act (UFIR) that proposed a solution to long-term economic
impact concern by adding an independent process to supplement the existing CFIUS
regulation. See S. 1983, 115th Cong. § 1002 (2017). Shortly after, on November 8, 2017,
Senators Cornyn and Pittenger introduced the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) touting its “laser-focus[] on national security.” See
Letter from William Perry, Former U.S. Department of Defense Secretary, to Senators
Cornyn and Feinstein Dec. 17, 2017) https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/sites/default/
files/Sec.%20Bill%20Perry%20letter%20FIRRMA.pdf.
99 The bill that housed the CFIUS reform legislation, the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, passed with bipartisan support in both
the House and Senate. This does not mean, however, that an overwhelming number of
legislators view FIRRMA itself, and each change implemented, as beneficial. Advocates
of the bill strategically attached the Defense Authorization Act because this act is a
“must-pass” by both parties due to its military funding implications; therefore, it cannot
be inferred that Congress views this legislation as optimal in its entirety. See Patricia
Zengerle & Mike Stone, Senate Passes Defense Bill, Battle Looms With Trump Over China’s ZTE,
REUTERS (June 18, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defensespending/senate-passes-defense-bill-battle-looms-with-trump-over-chinas-zte-idUSKB
N1JE2XA. See generally Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Schmitt, A Russian GPS Using U.S. Soil
Stirs Spy Fears: Proposal for Antennas Ignites Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2013, at A14;
Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 63 (discussing various foreign investment
transactions that raised concerns over the CFIUS’s review process).
100 See Remarks on Signing the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 at Fort Drum, New York, 2018 DAILY COMP PRES. DOC. 201800532.
(Aug. 13, 2018).
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investment and trade secret theft in the United States continues to grow. 101
Vulnerability to such exploitations is no secret; the counter-intelligence
efforts often thought to have died with the Cold War have simply
reemerged on the new battleground of the global marketplace. 102 Previous
generations of Americans felt threatened by Russian spies and feared
foreign invasions, but today, fear derives from foreign data breaches and
economic dependence. In particular, Congressional Reports address both
the rise of foreign investment by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and the fear that SOEs invest to meet strategic political objectives rather
than passive economic gains. 103
The number of transactions terminated through CFIUS significantly
increased under the Obama and Trump administrations. From 2011 to

101 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(2012) (defining “economic espionage”); Fitzpatrick, supra note
90, at 1091. The contention that CFIUS is being used as an economic protector more
than a national security watchdog loses traction in light of the CFIUS Committee’s
approval of the “Chinese-led consortium” Chongqing Casin Enterprise Group’s
acquisition of the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) in December 2016 despite members
of Congress expressing their worry over possible Chinese influence on the U.S. equity
market. See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 48; Alexander Osipovich, Chicago
Stock Exchange Ends Proposed Sale to Chinese Investors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-stock-exchange- ends-proposed-sale-to-chineseinvestors-1520281716. Likewise, CFIUS has not yet blacklisted any particular industry;
even semiconductor firm acquisitions which historically have faced heavy national
security concerns have received approval at times. See Notice, 73 Fed. Reg. 74570 (Dec.
8, 2008) (“[] CFIUS does not focus on any one U.S. business sector or group of sectors.”);
Hayley Ringle, Why ON Semiconductor’s $2.4B Fairchild Acquisition Took Nearly a Year to Close,
PHOENIX BUS. J. (Sep 20, 2016, 11:42 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/
news/2016/09/19/why-on-semiconductors-2-6-fairchild- acquisition.html.
102 See Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security Review Frameworks
as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age of Globalization, 33 N.W. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 199, 200 (2012) (“[T]he United States’ vulnerability to espionage—military or
economic—is hardly a secret . . . . Those operating on the frontlines of American
counter-intelligence efforts echo the sentiment: ‘The Cold War is not over, it has merely
moved into a new arena: the global marketplace.’” (quoting Investigation Programs
Counterintelligence Division, Focus on Economic Espionage, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www2.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2019)).
103 Jackson CRS Report 2017, supra note 36, at 28 (“According to the Organization for
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) ‘an estimated 22% of the world’s
largest 100 firms are now effectively under state control, the highest percentage in
decades.’” (citing ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES AS GLOBAL COMPETITORS: A CHALLENGE OR AN OPPORTUNITY? 13
(2016))).
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2016, the number of transactions reviewed by CFIUS increased by 55%. 104
Historically, presidents used CFIUS to block five transactions: (1) China
National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation acquisition of
MAMCO Manufacturing (1990); (2) Ralls Corporation completed
acquisition of an Oregon wind farm project (2012); (3) Chinese firm
Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund attempted acquisition of Aixtron, a
German-based semiconductor company that held U.S. assets (2016); (4)
Chinese investment firm, Canyon Bridge Capital Partners’ attempted $1.3
billion acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation; (5) Broadcom’s
attempted $117 billion takeover of Qualcomm (2018). 105 The magnitude
of CFIUS influence must not be diminished by the deceivingly small
number of blocked deals. Though unascertainable, a significant number
of deals are not formally blocked but are, nevertheless, informally derailed
by CFIUS. 106 For those deals that last through the initial investigation stage,
nearly half are terminated by the parties in a conscious choice to avoid a
negative CFIUS determination. 107 Note that four of the five blocked deals
occurred under President Obama and President Trump. 108 The reason for
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 § 1702(a)(4)
(2019).
105 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RES. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED DTATES (CFIUS) (2019) [hereinafter Jackson CRS Report
2019].
106 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2007). Since 2007, CFIUS activity increased
exponentially under FINSA; between 2008-2015 CFIUS investigated 333 of the 925
transactions that provided notices to the Committee. See CFIUS ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS
(2015). Sixty-two of these planned transactions were withdrawn; among them was the
divestment of an already complete $2 million asset purchase from a U.S. server
technology company by Chinese Hauwei while the companies awaited a decision from
the President. Id.; Carew & Wohl, supra 67. The first blocked transaction came in 1990
when President Bush ordered the divestment of China’s Aero-Technology Import and
Export Corporation acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33312, THE EXON-FLORIO NATIONAL SECURITY TEST FOR
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 21 (2013). Nearly half of the transactions CFIUS investigated
since 1990 CFIUS have been terminated by the parties. Jackson CRS Report 2017, supra
note 36, at 41 (referencing the Israeli firm Check Point Software Technologies’ decision
to terminate negotiations to purchase American firm Sourcefire for $225 million).
107 Jackson CRS Report 2017, supra note 36, at 41.
108 Jackson CRS Report 2019 supra note 105, at 18. Meanwhile, the tendency for firms to
self-terminate their transactions as a result of a CFIUS Committee recommendation has
continued. See, e.g., Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, MoneyGram and Ant Financial Call Off
Merger, Citing Regulatory Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/02/business/moneygram-ant-financial-china-cfius.html. On September 13,
104
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this increasing trend for CFIUS intervention is necessary in the new global
marketplace given the grave threat posed by the transfer of American
owned intellectual property and growing concerns over cyber security. 109 In
the last decade, Chinese investment in U.S. technology firms shifted from
primarily joint ventures or acquisitions to “greenfield” investments in
venture- backed startups aimed to acquire cutting-edge technology at the
early stages of development. 110
Current political action by the Trump Administration, like the push
for allies to prevent China’s Huawei from building Europe’s 5G network,
demonstrate the urgency and importance of winning the arms race for
technology. 111 The collapse of the Qualcomm-Broadcom hostile takeover
signaled a shift in the Committee’s concerns that previous legislation never
addressed CFIUS’ active involvement in this arms race. This is the only
transaction CFIUS blocked before any deal had been agreed to by the
parties. 112 Additionally, national security concerns presented as a possible
rationale for the Presidential Order blocking the deal included references
to the hypothetical decrease in research and development funding. The
2017, the President issued an Executive Order prohibiting the acquisition of Lattice
Semiconductor by Canyon Bridge Capital Partners. See Order of Sept. 13, 2017, 82 Fed.
Reg. 43665 (Sept. 13, 2017). This outcome can be attributed to both the nature of the
intellectual property involved in the deal and the corporate structure of Canyon Bridge
which is “a private equity fund backed by China Venture Capital Fund Corp. Ltd.; a
Chinese corporation owned by Chinese state-owned entities.” William McConnell, Trump
Blocks Lattice Semiconductor Deal, THE STREET (Sept. 13, 2017, 4:52 PM),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14304802/1/trump-blocks-lattice-semiconductordeal.html.
109 See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2018, 7:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/971409845453762560?lang=en (reacting
to the theft of intellectual property); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(July 24, 2018, 4:09 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/10217139050208
17413 (referencing unfavorable trade positions); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (May 11, 2017, 12:34 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/86275
2672683839488 (noting strengthening of cyber security).
110 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 97, at 9.
111 See David Sanger et al., In 5G Race With China, U.S. Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huaweichina-us-5g-technology.html (“The administration contends that the world is engaged in
a new arms race — one that involves technology, rather than conventional weaponry, but
poses just as much danger to America’s national security.”).
112 See Micheal Leiter et al., Broadcom’s Blocked Acquisition of Qualcomm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/4/03/broadcoms-blocked-acquisition-of-qualcomm/.
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diminishment of funds dedicated to leading 5G technology would have
allowed China to take a leadership role in that sector of the tech
industry. 113
ii. Changes to CFIUS
As discussed in greater detail in Part II, FIRRMA made changes to
CFIUS in three distinct areas: procedural structure, jurisdictional scope,
and judicial forum for parties seeking a remedy. The new law expands
CFIUS influence by increasing the scope of sectors subject to review,
changes the CFIUS review structure and its timing, and provides a
designated forum for judicial actions brought by parties. 114 The newly
enacted review process could impact nearly all contemplated mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures involving any foreign entity. 115 Under the
old regime, a transaction’s coverage turned on whether or not a foreign
entity gained “control.” Under the new statute, this bar has been lowered
to whether or not a foreign entity will acquire influence over decisions. 116

See Letter from Dep’t of the Treasury to Mark Plotkin & Theodore Kassinger (Mar.
5, 2018) (on file with the SEC at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
804328/000110465918015036/a18-7296_7ex99d1.htm); Sanger et al., supra note 111
(“In an age when the most powerful weapons, short of nuclear arms, are cybercontrolled, whichever country dominates 5G will gain an economic, intelligence and
military edge for much of this century.”).
114 The differences in the two versions of FIRRMA ultimately were reconciled in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate under the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2019, sent to the President, and signed into law. Differences between the House
and Senate versions of FIRRMA are outlined in multiple sources (mostly practitioner
releases for clients). See Fischer & Rabinowitz, Differing CFIUS Reform Bills Move Through
U.S. House and Senate, PILLSBURY: GLOBAL TRADE & SANCTIONS L. BLOG (June 26, 2018),
https://www.globaltradeandsanctionslaw.com/defense-bill-senate-cfius-reformlegislation/; The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS): Summary of
FIRRMA’s Key Provisions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/Documents/Summary-of-FIRRMA.pdf (last visited March 12,
2019). See generally John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019.
115 See David Levine et al., New CFIUS Rules May Impact All Foreign Investment in the United
States, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/insights/
cfius-rules-impact-foreign- investment-us/; Saleha Mohsin, U.S. Treasury Rules Strengthen
Oversight of Foreign Investors, INS. J. NEWS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal
.com/news/national/2018/10/11/504077.htm.
116 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 § 1703(a)(3)
(2019); see also infra Part II(A)(i).
113
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Additionally, “transaction” under FIRRMA now includes joint ventures. 117
FIRRMA jurisdiction now includes real estate transactions but fails to
cover non-property related “greenfield” investments. 118 New businesses
often exist without real estate assets and thus, this type of new investment
remains outside the scope of review. 119 CFIUS now has authority over
transactions between foreign parties and U.S. companies with access to
sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. FIRRMA expands CFIUS covered
transactions to include all “critical technologies,” a category which is
currently vague but will likely be determined in practice by the Department
of Defense (DOD). 120 Moreover, FIRRMA implements procedural
changes by: adding an additional, sometimes mandatory, step to the review
process; implementing filing fees; extending the number of days for
several stages of review; 121 and permitting the Committee to suspend a
transaction on its own. 122 Lastly, while the rationale of the Committee and
President will remain undisclosed, FIRRMA outlines that civil actions may
be brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 §
1703(a)(4)(B)(i) (2019).
118 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 §
1703(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2019). A traditional “greenfield” investment was the purchase of open
land, which is now a covered transaction through the real estate expansion; however, the
meaning “greenfield” now encompasses the establishment of any new domestic entity;
see MICHAEL RAMSEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
747 (4th ed. 2017).
119 See generally, Yung-Ming Cheng, Determinants of FDI Mode Choice: Acquisition, Brownfield,
and Greenfield, 23 CAN. J. OF ADMIN. SCIS. 202 (2006) (expanding with a full discussion on
FDI mode choice between acquisition, brownfield, and greenfield).
120 See The Lawfare Podcast: The Future of CFIUS, LAWFARE (June 2, 2018), https://www.law
fareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-future-cfius.
121 See Michael Gershberg & Justin Schenck, The CFIUS Reform Bill, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/08/26/the-cfius- reform-bill/ (“FIRRMA grants CFIUS itself the authority to
suspend a proposed or pending covered transaction . . . as long as the covered transaction
is under review . . . [and] refer a transaction to the President . . . at any time during the
review . . . .”).
122 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 2193 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565).
117
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Columbia Circuit where some evidence will only be available to judges, not
the parties. 123
E. Key Takeaways
To summarize, the interagency body called CFIUS reviews
transactions involving FDI to assess the impact on the U.S. economy and
national security. 124 After an investigation, the Committee gives a
recommendation to the President who then decides whether to approve,
block, or impose restricting conditions on the transaction. 125 Functionally,
the impacted parties do not have the ability to appeal the ultimate
determination because they do not have a right to have the reasoning by
the President disclosed. The new FIRRMA legislation greatly expanded
the number of reviewed transactions by increasing the scope of CFIUS
jurisdiction to include transactions resulting in foreign access to sensitive
personal data of U.S. citizens, “critical technologies,” and real estate.
FIRRMA does not eliminate the threat of foreign entities, including SOEs,
funding startup companies in the United States. Lastly, FIRRMA increases
the burden on parties by allowing CFIUS to require mandatory
declarations, impose filing fees, and provide delayed responses from the
Committee.
Moving forward, this foundation will be critical in analyzing the
interdependent aspects of the new CFIUS regime. Part II will build on this
base to discuss how the CFIUS jurisdiction expansion will have an
economic impact on the amount of inbound FDI. Additionally, Part II
uses this foundation to address why security issues surrounding start- ups
funded by foreign investors are not resolved by FIRRMA. Lastly, the
background will aid discussion about FIRRMA’s effect on judicial review,
transparency, and potential constitutional issues under the new mandatory
filings.
II. Analysis
Although FIRRMA’s bolstering of CFIUS power is a necessary shift,
these changes fall short of achieving their goal. FIRRMA does not
See generally Jill Priluck, The Mysterious Agency That Can Block a Global Merger, REUTERS
(July 8, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS37319485520130708 (illustrating
the ambiguity of CFIUS violations).
124 See generally Jackson CRS Report 2019, supra note 105 (explaining the role of CFIUS).
123

125

Id.

2019]

CFIUS REFORM: FEAR AND FIRRMA

105

effectively mitigate the national security threat of foreign control over the
same sources of cutting edge intellectual property on which the U.S.
military depends. FIRRMA’s overly broad restrictions on investment come
at the cost of lost capital injected into the U.S. economy, which contributes
to necessary economic growth and employment. 126 This increased breadth,
combined with FIRRMA’s inefficient structure, may actually intensify
national security concerns under FIRRMA; CFIUS’ ability to
accommodate the influx of reviews rests on the Treasury Department’s
ability to coordinate amplified operations among all Committee member
agencies. Furthermore, a deceleration of American innovation caused by
any underfunding of private sector research and development may harm
national defense operations.
Ultimately, from an economic standpoint, FIRRMA is likely to cause
unnecessary inefficiencies that will probably over-deter advantageous FDI
and thus prove detrimental to economic prosperity. Regarding national
security, FIRRMA fails to close loopholes in the regulatory procedures
that are necessary to resolve the threat of unregulated foreign
investment. 127 To prove these arguments, this section will analyze the most
influential changes FIRRMA made to CFIUS. Each of these changes will
be critiqued on two bases:
Whether it is likely to achieve the intended goal of further preserving
national security, and (2) Whether it does so efficiently so as to preserve
the interests of commerce. First, this section addresses how FIRRMA
adjusts the scope of CFIUS jurisdiction and critiques the ability of CFIUS
to accommodate these changes without compromising its ability to serve
as an adequate gatekeeper. Second, the discussion analyzes the effect of
adjustments to the application and review procedure. Third, this section
examines resurfacing Fifth Amendment issues argued in Ralls Corp in light
of the now mandatory application requirement.
A. Increased Scope of CFIUS Jurisdiction
FIRRMA expands the scope of CFIUS in five key ways. First, the
criteria triggering FDI is shifted from enabling foreign “control” of the
business to allowing foreign “influence” over business activities, and
accordingly, joint ventures are now a covered transaction form. Second,
the legislation adds foreign access to sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens
126
127

See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 28.
See infra Part II(A)(iv)(2), III(A)(i).

106

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

as a triggering element for CFIUS review. Third, the undefined sector of
“critical technologies” is added to the existing sector of critical
infrastructure as an area of the economy in which foreign involvement
would pose risks to national security. Fourth, real estate transactions of
both developed and undeveloped land involving foreign entities now fall
under CFIUS jurisdiction. Lastly, FIRRMA provides a potential carve-out
for some financial institutions with foreign limited partners benefiting
from passive investments in the United States.
i. Change from Control to Influence
In the past, CFIUS interpreted “control” very broadly. 128 FIRRMA
recalibrates this benchmark to the lower standard of “influence.” 129
FIRRMA states that CFIUS covers any direct or indirect investment in a
U.S. business that gives a foreign person access to “any material nonpublic
technical information,” access to the board of directors, or access to
decision-making beyond basic shareholder voting rights that could influence
company involvement in sensitive personal data; critical technologies; or
critical infrastructure. 130 This provision “is designed to capture small
investments that might not otherwise fall within CFIUS jurisdiction
because they lack the previously-required threshold of ‘control.’” 131 It is
reasonable to predict that this term too will be construed to include the
smallest interests feasible. 132
Additionally, transactions involving foreign entities are covered if a
foreign government possesses a substantial interest in a U.S. company
either directly or indirectly. 133 The code’s instructions to the Committee
128 See Kirkland & Ellis LLP, President Obama Heeds CFIUS and Blocks Chinese Takeover of
German Semiconductor Company, KIRKLAND ALERT (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.kirkland
.com/siteFiles/Publications/President_Obama_Heeds_CFIUS_and_Blocks_Chinese_
Takeover_of_German_Semiconductor_Company.pdf (“[I]n practice, CFIUS in-terprets
‘control’ very broadly.”).
129 See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
130 See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Nonpublic information includes trade secrets relevant to critical technologies and
infrastructure. See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019.
131 See William M. Hannay, Congress Enacts New Law to Control Foreign Investments in the U.S.,
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-enactsnew-law-to-control- foreign-investments-us.
132 See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 8.
133 See John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
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indicate that the definition of “substantial interest” includes a situation
where the government retains “influence on the actions of a foreign
person.” 134 This is significant because any corporation doing business in
an authoritarian country, like China, could potentially meet this expanded
criteria. The Chinese government is notorious for controlling its private
sector enterprises and establishing government owned businesses,
including financial firms like venture capital funds. 135 Specifically, China’s
2017 National Intelligence Law requires the support and cooperation of
Chinese organizations and citizens in the government’s intelligence
operations. 136
In alliance with concerns over foreign “influence,” FIRRMA expands
CFIUS to cover an additional type of transaction. 137 CFIUS now covers
joint ventures despite heavy protest by large American technology firms. 138
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.
See e.g., Schumpeter, China’s Private Sector Faces an Advance By the State, ECONOMIST (Dec.
8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/business/2018/12/08/chinas-private-sectorfaces-an-advance-by-the- state.
136 See Guojia Qingbao Fa (国家情报 法) [Law on National Intelligence] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 27, 2017, effective June 28, 2017) 2017
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 28 (China) http://www.npc.gov.cn/
npc/xinwen/2017-06/27/content_2024529.htm; Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing’s New
National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense, LAWFARE, (July 20, 2017, 11:30 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense
(“Article Seven stipulates that ‘any organization or citizen shall support, assist, and
cooperate with state intelligence work according to law.’ . . . ‘state intelligence work
organs, when legally carrying forth intelligence work, may demand that concerned organs,
organizations, or citizens provide needed support, assistance, and cooperation.’”).
137 Bloomberg refers to this change as “a key component of the bill and marks the most
significant change to the current CFIUS framework.” See Saleha Mohsin & Ben Brody,
Tech Firms May Beat Trump in Debate Over Chinese Joint Ventures, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2018,
12:38 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/tech-firms-maybeat-trump-in-debate-over-chinese- joint-ventures.
138 Many large American tech companies have partnerships with Chinese firms with
military ties. See U.S. Tech Companies and Their Chinese Partners With Military Ties, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/technology/USTech-Firms-and-Their-Chinese- Partnerships.html; Judith Lee et al., CFIUS Reform: Our
Analysis, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/cfius-reformour-analysis/; Mohsin & Brody, supra note 137 Critics also opposed CFIUS having
control over licensing agreements. Congress relocated issues of outbound investment
like licensing agreements to the Export Controls Act of 2018, also signed into law in
NDAA, but joint ventures were left to CFIUS. See John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. Nevertheless, the DOD warns that the sharing
134
135
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Previously, FINSA did not categorize joint ventures as a covered
transaction type and thus FINSA permitted foreign entities to collaborate
with corporations without exposure to CFIUS review because the
technical agreement structure was not a merger, acquisition, or takeover.
This difference in strategic corporate structuring no longer permits the
unchecked transfer of information and resources. 139
Though lowering the standard from “control” to “influence”
adequately encompasses concerns associated with the uncertain impact of
authoritarian government on private entities, this shift also creates the
possibility that the Committee could choose to embark down an inefficient
slippery-slope that could result in excess filings for transactions that do
not pose significant national security threats. 140 For example, if the
Committee were to interpret its authority and the “influence” standard to
the broadest extent, it could mean that American companies—including
big household names like Walmart, Apple, Boeing, and Starbucks—with
operations in China could be burdened to file for CFIUS review for every
merger, acquisition, and joint venture they undertake so long as they
remain active in Chinese markets where the Chinese government has
authoritarian control. 141 Excessive filing would hinder CFIUS’ goal of
protecting the United States economically and would increase the risk that
the regulatory mechanism will be overburdened, causing the potential for
deterioration in review quality where it is needed to protect national
security.
ii. Sensitive Personal Data
FIRRMA further expands CFIUS jurisdiction by classifying any
transaction that would result in foreign access to sensitive personal data
of U.S. citizens as a covered transaction. In the wake of private data
of intellectual property inherent in these deal structures despite the Export Control
system. See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43.
139 See Mohsin & Brody, supra note 137 (quoting a spokesman from Conrnyn’s office,
Drew Brandewie, who stated that, “China has a long track record of pressuring U.S.
companies into joint ventures to coerce them into sharing technology critical to our
national security . . . in spite of our export control system . . . .”).
140 This is not a guarantee. Luckily, there is still opportunity to narrow the impact of this
expansion through Committee drafted Federal Regulations. See infra Part III(C).
141 See Philip van Doorn, Apple, Nike and 18 Other U.S. Companies Have $158 Billion at Stake
in China Trade War, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 4, 2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.market
watch.com/story/trade-war-watch-these-are-the-us-companies-with-the-most-at-stakein-china-2018-03-29.
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scandals with Equifax, Yahoo!, and Facebook, the European Union’s
recent implementation of data legislation brought the issue of personal
data privacy to the forefront of political discussion. 142 Unlike the United
States, the European Union consolidated and synchronized the law on data
privacy by passing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that
became effective in May 2018. 143 The CFIUS Committee expressed its
concerns over data in the MoneyGram-Ant Financial deal, though both
parties terminated the agreement before reaching the President for final
review. 144 Congress reacted to MoneyGram-Ant Financial, recent data
scandals, and international pressure by giving CFIUS jurisdiction over
data. 145 CFIUS is the wrong mechanism to implement this type of
legislation. Implementation of international data transfer regulation
142 See Elizabeth Reise, USA Today’s List of the Biggest Data Breaches and Hacks of All Time,
USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/
2017/10/03/biggest-data-breaches-and-hacks-all-time/729294001/;
Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far,
N.Y. TIMES (April 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/
cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.
The GDPR requires institutions to provide in plain language, notice and purpose of data
collection, obtain consent, provide security and disclosure, and permit access to users’
own data and lastly, maintain accountability. See generally Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. The impact of these new requirements is far-reaching;
by covering anyone whose data involves the European Union, the EU set the foundation
for a global data protection platform. The international impact can be seen already
though the Privacy Shield, a cross between legislation and a treaty that implements the
data transfer framework for EU Citizens’ data held within the United States. Due to the
GDPR and public concern over an individual’s own personal data being collected,
harvested, and sold, it is not surprising that legislators sought to include elements of data
protection into CFIUS review.
143 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L.
REV. 995, 995–96 (2017).
144 See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at 72. Ant Financial, a subsidiary of Alibaba
which is China’s leading e-commerce company, sought to acquire the American money
transfer firm, MoneyGram, for $1.2 billion. Id. Though the President had not yet blocked
the transaction, the parties chose to mutually terminate their intended agreement. See Press
Release: MoneyGram And Ant Financial Announce Termination Of Amended Merger Agreement,
MONEYGRAM (Jan. 2, 2018, 4:15 PM), http://ir.moneygram.com/news-releases/newsrelease-details/moneygram-and-ant-financial-announce- termination-amended-merger
(leaving investors on notice that CFIUS would not approve the deal but nevertheless
indicating intentions to establish a strategic cooperation with Ant Financial).
145 See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III) (2019).
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through CFIUS will burden the efficiency of a critical national security
committee and unnecessarily hinder economic prosperity across the
United States because (1) “sensitive personal data” is left undefined; and
(2) broad interpretation could expose nearly all companies within the
United States as well as many overseas to CFIUS review of their
transactions whenever a foreign entity is a party.
FIRRMA does not define “sensitive personal data,” but the GDPR
legislation uses the same term. The European law broadly defines it as any
data relating to an identified or identifiable person. 146 Outside the GDPR,
whether data is considered “sensitive” is subjective as is evidenced by
various levels of publication by individuals. For example, sexual
orientation and political preferences are included in the GDPR list of
protected data, but anyone on Facebook can attest that it is common for
individuals to “share” this type of information openly online. 147 Because
FIRRMA failed to define “sensitive personal data,” the Committee is left
to eventually draw the line somewhere. Even if defined, imposing
regulations on the otherwise legal transfers of data is inadequate because
there will inevitably remain rampant unnegotiated breaches and no parallel
requirements are imposed on companies to give users some control in
what happens to their data. Adding to CFIUS’ duties will not solve the
massive data privacy problem that the Legislative Branch faces. 148
The GDPR states that “‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as
a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person.” Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33.
Examples include: “personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs; trade-union membership; genetic data, biometric data
processed solely to identify a human being; health-related data; data concerning a person’s
sex life or sexual orientation.” What personal data is considered sensitive?, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data- protection/reform/rulesbusiness-and-organisations/legal-grounds-processing-data/sensitive-data/whatpersonal-data-considered-sensitive_en (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
147 While privacy settings exist on many social media platforms, many users ignore these
setting options. See e.g., Alyssa Newcomb, How to update your privacy settings on Facebook,
Twitter, Google and Instagram, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2018 12:24 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/how-update-your-privacy-settingsfacebook-twitter-google-instagram-n877216. Furthermore, those with access to the
“private” account can photograph any content posted.
148 The GDPR does, however, force U.S. companies, if they hold any private data of E.U.
citizens, to adhere to GDPR mandates. See e.g., Yaki Faitelson, Yes, the GDPR Will Affect
Your U.S.-Based Business, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
146
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FIRRMA’s expansion of CFIUS obligations, including international
transfers involving this form of asset, may result in inefficient reviews,
again depleting resources that are necessary to investigate other national
security matters. While “sensitive personal data” is yet to be defined, under
the broadest possible interpretation of the term, it is difficult to identify any
industry without access to some form of data that could be considered
“sensitive” and “personal.” For example, if an individual’s financial data is
considered sensitive and personal, then most end-user service providers
and merchants could be subject to CFIUS jurisdiction under FIRMA
because they collect individuals’ credit card numbers. For service
providers that do not charge for their platforms, they profit by running
ads—ads that are tailored by individual preferences identified through
data collection. 149 Moving offline, consider the healthcare industry: both
researchers and providers retain medical information identifiable to their
patients. Only strictly business-to-business firms appear safe from any
potential expansion of the “sensitive personal data” category.
Ultimately, the incomplete structure of data protection law in the
United States likely negates the potential benefits of this expansion. The
issue of data protection must be acknowledged, and although it poses risks
that relate to matters of national security, CFIUS is not the proper channel
to handle this issue if it is to remain a genuine gatekeeper of U.S. economic
security threatened by inbound foreign direct investment. FIRRMA
designs CFIUS to review foreign transactions exclusively and does not
address any disclosures or protection measures for harboring data without
intent to transfer on the international market. CFIUS is not designed to
handle complex data analytics and does not currently specialize in the
technical expertise needed to ensure data regulation compliance. Further,
the increase in transactions CFIUS would need to review as a result of this
provision will likely burden the Committee’s ability to efficiently identify
national security issues involved in other transactions.

sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/12/04/yes-the-gdpr-will-affect-your-u-s-basedbusiness/#2acaba5a6ff2.
149 See Facebook: Transparency and the Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On
Energy and Com., 115th Cong. 47 (2018) (statement by Mark Zuckerberg, Co-founder,
Chairman and CEO, Facebook, Inc.).
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iii. Critical Technologies
Taking aim at Silicon Valley, FIRRMA adds the new category of
“critical technologies” to the list of covered transactions. This change is
significant because it is the first “depart[ure] from CFIUS’ exclusive focus
on reviewing inbound foreign investment, and expand[s] its remit to
include outbound contributions of certain intellectual property by U.S.
businesses.” 150 FIRRMA shows that Congress is no longer only worried
about foreign ownership of critical infrastructure within the United States
but is equally concerned about critical technologies leaving the control of
the United States due to the rise of the global marketplace. The
consequence of this shift led FIRRMA to add a special covered transaction
category to trigger CFIUS review whenever “critical technologies” are
involved in any foreign transaction regardless of the structural transaction
type or size of the investment.
Interestingly, FIRRMA reacts to the fear of losing technological
superiority 151 by eliminating incentives to stay in the lead by making it more
difficult for these innovative industry leaders to operate in the efficiencydriven economy. 152 Absent regulatory oversight of intellectual property

See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 36.
Trade secret theft is a valid concern. See THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN
RESEARCH, UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION REPORT: THE THEFT OF AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: REASSESSMENTS OF THE CHALLENGE AND UNITED STATES
POLICY 2 (2017) (“[E]stimates suggest that trade secret theft is between 1% and 3% of
GDP, meaning that the cost to the $18 trillion U.S. economy is between $180 billion and
$540 billion”). While this data is slightly outdated, it nevertheless shows the magnitude
of the issue. Economically speaking, the estimated cost to the U.S. of intellectual property
theft in 2017 was between $180-$540 billion. See Sanger et al., supra note 111 (stating that
“Chinese cyberintrusions of American companies and government entities have
occurred repeatedly, including by hackers suspected of working on behalf of China’s
Ministry of State Security.”). This figure includes cyberintrusions and data breaches of
American companies, some of which are attributed to foreign governments. Id. Although
other legislative efforts like Section 1637 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization
Act addressed theft, proper cross-border acquisitions that transferred valuable intellectual
property, and possibly exposed it to increased risk of theft, remained solely under the
discretion of CFIUS. See THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, UPDATE TO THE
IP COMMISSION REPORT: THE THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
REASSESSMENTS OF THE CHALLENGE AND UNITED STATES POLICY 3, 17–18 (2017)
(listing the possibility of increasing CFIUS power as a short-term solution that was yet
to be implemented at the time).
152 According to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Investment Security, the
decision to expand covered transactions to include “critical industries” involved weighing
the economic and national security factors stating:
150
151
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transfer, national security depends on the United States being the first to
access new technology and innovate so rapidly that by the time that
technology reaches foreign hands, it is irrelevant because the United States
has already moved ahead. 153 Agencies dedicated to national security
including the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security have
grown increasingly dependent on the private sector and have forged
innovative partnerships in Silicon Valley. 154 In the field of emerging
technologies, products designed and used for commercial purposes are
increasingly serving the needs of the military. 155 As a result, both an
economic collapse of the California tech hubs and the theft or acquisition

Although the vast majority of foreign direct investment in the United
States provides economic benefits to our nation—including the
promotion of economic growth, productivity, competitiveness, and
job creation—some foreign direct investment threatens to undermine
the technological superiority that is critical to U.S. national security.
Specifically, the threat to critical technology industries is more
significant than ever as some foreign parties seek, through various
means, to acquire sensitive technologies with relevance for U.S.
national security.
83 Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51324 (Oct. 11, 2018).
153 Though the Unites States is not ranked first in the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s (WIPO) Global Innovation Index, the position is one of leadership
regardless. See WIPO et. al, Global Innovation Index 2018: China Cracks Top 20. Top Rankings:
Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Singapore, U.S., WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (July 10,
2018), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_0005.html; KPMG,
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: TECH HUBS FORGING
NEW PATHS TO OUTPACE THE COMPETITION 3, 35 (2018) (listing the United States as
“[t]he tech industry global outpacer”). The background provided by CFIUS with the pilot
program regulations explicitly notes fear over “the threat of erosion of technological
superiority.” 83 Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51324 (Oct. 11, 2018).
154 See Heather Somerville, Defense Department’s Tech Investing Signals Silicon Valley’s Importance
in Cyberwarfare, MERCURY NEWS (May 13, 2015, 5:56 PM), https://www.mercury
news.com/2015/05/13/defense-departments-tech-investing-signals-silicon-valleysimportance-in-cyberwarfare/; Terri Moon Cronk, Carter: DoD, Private-Sector Tech Innovation
Keep U.S. Ahead, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Mar. 3, 2016) (“Bridging ties between
DoD and Silicon Valley has resulted in several initiatives, such as the Defense Digital
Service, the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, and the secretary’s announcement
yesterday of the Defense Innovation Advisory Board.”), https://dod.defense.gov/
News/Article/Article/685675/carter-dod-private-sector-tech-innovation-keep-usahead/; Silicon Valley Innovation Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/svip (expanding on the roles of DHS
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Silicon Valley Innovation Program (SVIP) in
tackling the hardest problems faced by DHS and the Homeland Security Enterprise by
finding new technologies that strengthen national security).
155 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 97, at 8.
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of intellectual property used by the DOD would pose risks to national
security.
Yielding to pressures driven largely by rapid innovation, Congress left
the specific definition of this new triggering category largely
undetermined. FIRRMA does not limit the “critical technologies” to only
those that are currently utilized by the military; Congress tactfully avoided
defining what technologies are considered critical because, with today’s
rapid pace of innovation, the relevancy of a strict bright-line list of
currently critical technologies would quickly expire. 156 The legislation
avoids creating a list by outlining a compilation of lists determined by
other government entities that are updated regularly. 157 CFIUS identified
this rapid change in technology as a primary compelling circumstance for
implementing a pilot program. 158
CFIUS Additions Via Recommendations
FIRRMA further leaves room for those lists to expand by allowing the
Committee chairperson to recommend additional technologies to add to
one of the lists the legislation includes. 159 While the Committee expects to
reach consensus on such matters, to have eleven government agencies all
in agreement is unlikely. Each department has its own interests and
perspectives, and thus are likely to value concerns differently. On a
See Marina Gorbis, Innovation Is Happening Faster Than We Can Adapt, N.Y. TIMES (July
22, 2015, 3:31 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/22/is-siliconvalley-saving-the-world-or-justmaking-money/innovation-is-happening-faster-thanwe-can-adapt (“[T]echnologies are emerging faster than our institutional capacity to adapt
to them . . . we will need dynamic thinkers and policymakers to balance established needs
with this growth.”).
157 See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(A)) (2019). This list includes: defense articles or defense
services included on the United States Munitions List; the Commerce Control List by the
Export Administration; nuclear equipment, parts and components, materials, software,
technology, facilities, material; and emerging and foundational technologies featured in
the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. See 83 Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51328 (Oct.
11, 2018). Particular technologies this act identifies as emerging and foundational are
expected to be released imminently. See e.g., Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS: FIRRMA Pilot
Program Mandates Notification for Certain Critical Technology, WHITE & CASE LLP (Oct. 13,
2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-firrma-pilot-programmandates-notification-certain-critical-technology.
158 83 Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51325 (Oct. 11, 2018).
159 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2182 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)(B)(i)).
156
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practical level, the DOD will heavily influence the ultimate defining of
“critical technologies.” 160 This is disturbing because the DOD is able to
single out any industry and operates in the “black.” 161 The DOD can make
a claim to the Committee and support this claim by stating that it cannot
disclose its reasoning or evidence while imposing significant transaction
costs on entire industries, not just particular deals. This is bad public policy
due to the potential for unchecked abuse of power.
Note further, that the President of the United States again maintains
control of the final contents of the list the CFIUS Committee can
amend. 162 Potentially for political purposes, the President could subject
entire industries to the negative effects of CFIUS review borne by the
parties who must seek approval; this presents an additional opportunity for
the abuse of power. For example, it would be legal, but potentially
unwarranted, for the President to remove the Committee’s hypothetical
addition of pharmaceutical development as a critical technology sector.
The Committee may have justifiable reason for making a suggested
addition, however, the President is not obligated to present a rationale for
accepting or ignoring the Committee’s proposal. Consequently, the
underlying motivation behind the President’s action to shelter or subject a
particular industry could be improper, such as to please campaign donors
or a supportive voter demographic.
Anticipated Breadth and Uncertainty
The current pilot program, effective as of November 10, 2018,
includes twenty-seven industries identified by NAICS code. 163 Among
See Nova Daly et al., The Lawfare Podcast: The Future of CFIUS, LAWFARE (Jun. 2, 2018,
1:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-future-cfius (citing as evidence
of the strengthening of the DOD, the speakers note the 700% increase in funding
delegated to the DOD up almost $20 million).
161 The term “black” is commonly used in reference to the “black budget” and “black
projects” of the DOD that are intentionally left to function free from disclosures or
reporting. See e.g., ALICE C. MARONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB87201, SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAMS AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET: UNDERSTANDING THE “BLACK BUDGET” 5
(1989) (“In using the term ‘black budget,’ most observers are making a generic reference
to the programs . . . for which DOD has not provided unclassified funding data . . . .”).
162 See Export Control Reform Act of 2018, as part of the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2211
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4812(a)).
163 U.S. Dep’t of Treasury: Office of Public Affairs, Q&A: Interim Regulations for
FIRRMA Pilot Program (Oct. 10, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/
QA-FIRRMA-Pilot- Program.pdf (providing answers to questions on retroactive
160
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these twenty-seven are research and development in biotechnology and
nanotechnology, and manufacturing of semiconductors, optical
instruments and lenses, batteries, turbines, petrochemicals, aircrafts, and
radio and television broadcasting and wireless communications
equipment. 164 This initial list focuses more on hardware than software
which is unlikely to continue as the DOD, with the initiative of protecting
the United States from both bombs and cyberattacks alike, increases its
involvement. 165 No barriers prevent the government agencies delegated
with the responsibility of updating the included lists, or CFIUS, who can
recommend that additions be made, from adding hundreds of NAICS
codes or abandoning the code distinctions in favor of general, sector-wide
industry terms. In his praise for the strengthened CFIUS authority,
President Trump emphasized passing FIRRMA as a base point saying,
“[w]e’ll see if that’s good enough, and if it’s not, then we will keep adding
on to it.” 166 Given national security’s dependence on the private sector, this
expansion may be counterproductive because the potential overbreadth
could cripple the quick pace of business that enables Silicon Valley to
thrive. Critical industries are being protected to aid the preservation of
their globally advantageous position, which accordingly aids national
defense.
Nevertheless, broad or quickly changing definitions are necessary
because the government is not well-equipped to identify which specific
new technologies today will become driving foundational technologies in
the future and present threats to national security. 167 To exemplify this
application and industry selection in questions twelve and seventeen); see also 83 Interim
Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51328, 51333–34 (Oct. 11, 2018); States Census Bureau, North American
Industry Classification System, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, https://www.census.gov/eos/
www/naics/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (“The North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business
establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data
related to the U.S. business economy.”).
164 For full list of all twenty-seven pilot program industries, see Annex A of the Interim
Regulations. See 83 Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51333–34 (Oct. 11, 2018).
165 See CATHERINE A. THEOHARY & ANNE I HARRINGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43848, CYBER OPERATIONS IN DOD POLICY AND PLANS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1
(2015).
166 Remarks During a Roundtable Discussion on the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 01800544 (Aug. 23, 2018).
167 See Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, Chinese Investment in Critical U.S.
Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests: Insights From a CFR Workshop, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (last visited on Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/chinese-
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point, consider the Soviet Union’s acquisition of ball bearing technology. 168
The U.S. government never anticipated that this knowledge would
eventually become a critical element in the Russian ownership of
precision-guided missiles. 169 This is unacceptable; national security must be
preserved by limiting access to intellectual property related to emerging
technologies.
This change to CFIUS is critical to national security and has the
potential to serve as an effective solution to current demands, but it is
equally likely that the vagueness of FIRRMA will cause a chilling effect
and deter beneficial investments. The ease of expanding the definition of
“critical technologies” creates uncertainty in the market. Furthermore, this
uncertainty will deter foreign investment and decrease the market of
acquirers and investors. This could harm American companies both at the
beginning of their growth cycle, should venture capital become more
competitive without foreign funds in the market, and at the end of their
development cycle by limiting the number of potential buyers. In
conclusion, by leaving so much undetermined, FIRRMA increases
uncertainty which may weaken incentives needed to drive innovation and
protect the nation in the new age of defense.
iv. Real Estate and the Greenfield Problem
Prior to FIRRMA, transactions with foreign entities involving real
estate within the United States did not automatically trigger CFIUS review.
While past blocked deals sometimes involved real estate, like the Ralls
Corp. windfarms, the involvement of land did not itself subject the
transaction to review, but rather, the CFIUS jurisdiction derived from the
shift in control of an existing American businesses to foreign investors. 170
The amendment clarifies that it is use of land and not ownership of land

investment-critical-us-technology-risks-us-security-interests [hereinafter “Greenberg
Center”].
168 See THANE GUSTAFSON, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
(DARPA), R-2649-ARPA, SELLING THE RUSSIANS THE ROPE?, SOVIET TECHNOLOGY
POLICY AND U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 10–14 (1981).
169 See Greenberg Center, supra note 167.
170 See Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment, 758 F.3d 296, 301, 321 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
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that drives concern. 171 Not only do purchases qualify but also any leases
or concessions to a foreign entity. 172 The reasoning behind this shift
focuses on national security breaches that could develop from the use of
land that does, or could, serve as an airbase or port, land that is near military
bases, or land close to other sensitive government facilities. 173 President
Trump highlighted this feature, stating that through FIRRMA, “we’re
doing a lot of things against foreign acquisition of property, and especially
where they’re near sensitive military installations. So this was a very big
deal.” 174 This amendment brings two significant benefits. First, it
establishes predictability by avoiding questionable filings which eliminates
parties’ search for inscrutable information. Second, it stops the
establishment of new companies by foreign entities when there is a land
purchase involved. Unfortunately, it does not go far enough because
FIRRMA does not cover the issue of funding new, not currently formed
companies on paper without current physical assets. 175
FIRRMA Successfully Avoids Questionable Filings
Parties involved in the foreign purchase of land have been uncertain
whether they need to submit notice to CFIUS, or if filing only wastes
resources. By nature, undisclosed military projects will not advertise their
location, and as a result, no amount of due diligence by parties guarantees
that a location is absolutely clear of national security concerns. FIRRMA
aids process efficiency by eliminating the uncertainty surrounding foreign
transactions with real estate assets. CFIUS review now applies to three
types of land- related foreign direct investments: (1) acquisitions of
existing U.S. companies with land assets; (2) the lease and use of property
known as “brownfield” investments; and (3) the acquiring of vacant land

See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2177 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(ii)).
171

172

Id.
See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2177 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)).
174 Remarks During a Roundtable Discussion on the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act of 2018, 2018, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 01800544 (Aug. 23, 2018).
175 See MICHAEL RAMSEY ET AL., supra note 118, at 747.
173
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for later development. 176 Parties engaging in this type of FDI no longer
need to debate the best course of action—CFIUS has jurisdiction. To
clarify, FIRRMA efficiently restricts the real estate category. Not every real
estate transaction in the United States will be reviewed by CIFIUS. 177 That
would be a gross misuse of resources by the Committee, and FIRRMA
appropriately acknowledges this by providing a carve-out for minor
transactions like those regarding single family dwellings. 178 Like all CFIUS
jurisdiction, the focus rightly remains on FDI, and thus only real estate
transactions involving FDI are covered.
FIRRMA Fails to Cover Establishment of Greenfield Investments
Though the real estate expansion effectively and efficiently accounts
for land purchases, it is probable that FIRRMA will ultimately fail to
address “greenfield” investments. 179 Today, the term “greenfield”
investment refers to the establishment of subsidiaries and the funding of
new business ventures. Historically, Congress tailored CFIUS provisions
to address national security concerns in mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
rather than new investments. 180 The logic behind focusing only on
The traditional true “greenfield” definition is “any construction of a new facility in
the United Sates by a foreign person.” Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 1, 41. In 2013,
the Russian space agency, Roscosmos, intended to construct GPS stations within the
United States but regardless of the CFIUS Committee’s opposition which was rooted in
concerns voiced by the CIA, DOD, and members of Congress, CFIUS was unable to
review greenfield investments at this time. See Jackson CRS Report 2018, supra note 36, at
63; see also Schmidt & Schmitt, supra note 99.
177 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2177 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(C)(i)).
176

178

Id.
Surprisingly this point escaped the scrutiny from mainstream media and few firms
have included the distinction between true “greenfield” land purchases, which are
covered, and common or modern “greenfield” investments in their updates to clients.
But see Michael E. Leiter et al., US Finalizes CFIUS Reform: What It Means for Dealmakers
and Foreign Investment, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Aug. 6, 2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/08/us-finalizes-cfius-reform
(“FIRRMA codifies CFIUS’ jurisdiction to review the purchase of U.S. business-owned
real estate while also expanding CFIUS’ jurisdiction to include leases and other real estate
transactions as well as purchases of vacant land (i.e., true ‘greenfield’ investments.”).
180 See Gary Husisian, CFIUS and the New Trump Administration: Your Top Ten Questions
Answered, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.foley.com/cfius-andthe-new-trump-administration-your-top-ten-questions-answered-01-25-2017/
179
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originally intended transaction types loses validity now that FIRRMA
added the real estate category, which by default includes new investments
in land. Hypothetically, foreign entities could establish a subsidiary in the
United States that does not incorporate the elements of real estate,
purchase of an existing asset, or entail a merger or joint venture with an
American business. This legislation requires one of these triggering
elements to occur concurrently with the establishment of a business entity
to be fully effective in stopping the invasion of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). 181 The resulting paper entity from this hypothetical structuring
would not be free to operate as an American company and avoid CFIUS
in the future when engaging in later transactions, but in the interim, the
new entity would be able to hire skilled American innovators and engage
in research and development. FIRRMA likely does not effectively ensure
that the next great breakthrough in American innovation is controlled by
American financial backing. Congress knew well of the issues associated
with SOE market entrants, from China specifically. 182 A Senate Hearing
testimony back in 2017 acknowledged that “when you go to Silicon Valley,
it is sort of an open secret that Chinese firms are all over the place trying
to acquire brains, technology, [therefore] trying to get around export
controls and CFIUS.” 183 Furthermore, the DOD stressed its concern over
unregulated startup investments into cutting edge technology in areas like

(expanding in question six on the historical gap of monitoring of “greenfields or new
start-up ventures” due to the focus on M&A).
181 See Jim Talent, Chinese ‘Greenfield’ Investments Are a Threat More Than a Benefit, NAT’L
REV. (Jun. 28, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/china-greenfield
-investments-national- security-threat/.
182 See generally Examining the Role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urb. Aff., 115th Cong. 1–2 (2017); Jen
Patja Howell, The Lawfare Podcast: The Future of CFIUS, LAWFARE (Jun. 2, 2018, 1:30 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-future-cfius. Greenfield investment by
Chinese entities is neither a recent phenomenon nor is it limited to Silicon Valley. See Ping
Deng, Investing for Strategic Resources and its Rationale: The Case of Outward FDI From Chinese
Companies, 50 BUS. HORIZONS 71, 75 (2007) (quoting a Chinese investor in Camden,
South Carolina back in 1999 who said, “By setting up the production plant in the U.S.,
we aim to draw on America’s expertise in design, research, innovation, and technology,
as well as to increase our global brand.” (Haier Group, personal communication, Aug.
2004)).
183 Examining the Role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urb. Aff., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of James
A. Lewis, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
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artificial intelligence, robotics, and blockchain. 184 One change suggested by
the DOD in its 2017 Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) draft
report was to discourage the funding of U.S. start-ups involved in
developing cutting-edge technologies. 185 Early advancements in emerging
areas of technology like these commonly become the foundational
building blocks for innovation in the future. 186 FIRRMA’s failure to add
the transactional form of initial establishment, the modern “greenfield”
investment strategy, to the scope of CFIUS likely means that start-up
investments that do not involve an existing U.S. entity are not covered
under CFIUS.
This constitutes a lapse in CFIUS’ ability to protect the national
security interests of the United States by exposing the nation to strategic
ownership of potentially critical technology by foreign entities, including
SOEs. 187 FIRRMA supporters argue for the need to protect the innovation
of American minds for both economic independence and military
advancement purposes through the “critical technologies” addition to
CFIUS’ scope. However, those benefits could escape through this
establishment, and later employment, loophole. Chinese SOEs are able to
bet early on American technological innovation and if they bet correctly—
invest by employing the creators of the next big Silicon Valley start-up—
then the United States will lose the crucial advantage the Legislature

See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 97. An example of this type of joint venture that
coerces the transfer of cutting-edge technology is the 2015 IBM partnership with
Teamsun, a Chinese cyber-security company. See Mohsin & Brody, supra note 137 (“The
Defense Department has raised concerns about Chinese investors financing American
startups that are developing leading-edge technology in sectors with military applications
like artificial intelligence, augmented reality and robotics.”).
185 See JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 36, at 36; Fred Kaplan, The Pentagon’s
Innovation Experiment, MIT TECH. REV., (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.technology
review.com/s/603084/the-pentagons-innovation-experiment/ (expanding on the
Pentagon’s DUIx and the outlook on its continuation under the Trump Administration).
186 See BROWN & SINGH, supra note 97, at 7.
187 See Greenberg Center, supra note 167 (“U.S. policymakers should view them as being
made at the behest of the Chinese government, whether due to the availability of
financing from state-owned banks or due to the Communist Party of China’s influence
over significant private-sector companies.”). Additionally, the workshop insights conclude
that increased Chinese investment in new technology could have two national security
implications: (1) a direct threat to the U.S. military’s technological superiority; and (2) an
undermining of U.S. economic competitiveness. Id.
184
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appears intent to maintain. 188 The correct balance of national security and
economic activity is difficult to ascertain but the correct balance is
unachievable if there are potentially harmful investments going not just
uninvestigated, but undocumented as foreign until it is too late.
v. Investment Fund Carveout
FIRRMA evades the complex issues for CFIUS reform attributable to
the integration of foreign funds in American financial institutions. In its
shift to cover noncontrolling investments in U.S. businesses involved with
critical technology and personal information, drafters of FIRRMA needed
to decide how to categorize massive investment funds that have both
significant influence and foreign beneficiaries. 189 Complicating matters is
the prerogative that it is nearly impossible to verify which entities are the
true beneficiaries of these investments. 190 Even if possible, implicating all
foreign investment would overburden both CFIUS and negatively impact
the stock market due to uncertainty and speculation. As a result, FIRRMA
wisely left indirect investments outside CFIUS’ expanded jurisdiction. 191
Foreign investment into investment funds does not trigger CFIUS review
so long as (1) the fund is managed by a general or managing partner; that
partner is not a foreign person; and (3) the investment fund satisfies that
any foreign investor is only a limited partner. 192 As a limited partner, the
foreign person does not control the fund’s investment decisions, determine

Examining the Role of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urb. Aff., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of James
A. Lewis, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
189 Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
remarked that “the role and influence of institutional investors has grown over time.” See
Luis A. Aguilar, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 23, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/
23/institutional-investors-power-and-responsibility/ (noting specifically that even “[i]n
2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate 73% of the outstanding equity in the
1,000 largest U.S. corporations.”).
190 See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 58, at 409–10.
191 See e.g., John M. Caccia et al., Governance Implications of CFIUS Reform for US Investment
Funds With Foreign Investors, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 30,
2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/10/governanceimplications-of-cfius-reform.
192 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2180–81 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(vi)(I)).
188
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the compensation of the general partner, or have access to trade secrets or
board of directors of the U.S. companies with which the fund invests. 193
This is likely the best temporary position to avoid overburdening both
funding mechanisms throughout the country and the Committee’s current
enforcement limitations. FIRRMA likely falls short of implementing an
optimal long-term solution needed to ensure passive investment does not
become active in the aggregate and threaten national security. If a large
portion, or even the majority, of an investment fund is attributed to foreign
investors there may be reason for CFIUS to want Congress delegated
jurisdiction to review the large transactions involving the fund. By having
undisclosed economic strongholds, it is possible that foreign investors
could systematically divest and cause ripple effects throughout financial
markets. Any threat to economic stability could delay innovation into
critical technology directly impacting national defense. In the long term,
the threat of unified foreign control through millions of small investments
must be mitigated and FIRRMA does not adequately provide a plan that
addresses this concern. CFIUS is unlikely the best resource to watch the
market as a whole due to capacity issues with oversight. Rather CFIUS
should work in unison with b e t t e r e q u i p p e d regulatory agencies like
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that have the expertise to
handle massive data analytics. 194
B. Procedural Changes
From a procedural perspective, FIRRMA is significant because it (1)
imposes a mandatory filing of declarations for certain triggering
transactions; (2) expands the duration of days permitted at each stage of
CFIUS review; and (3) gives the Committee authority to implement
sanctions before giving its recommendation to the President to make a
final determination. Because these adjustments are accompanied by an
expanded definition of covered transactions, they are likely to create a delay
in the transaction process for an unprecedented number of industries. 195
By increasing transaction costs, FIRRMA’s procedure decreases the
potential economic benefit derived from FDI.

193

Id.
See infra Part III(B)(i).
195 See supra Part II(a).
194
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i. Mandatory Declarations
FIRRMA mandates that parties privy to certain covered transactions
file a mandatory declaration. 196 Not only does this change add an entirely
new initial step to the FDI oversight process, but it also is the first time
that CFIUS filings are mandatory rather than voluntary. 197 Unlike the
already existing full notice filing, the declaration filing is not to exceed five
pages, but all other requirements are left to the discretion of the
Committee to be specified later by federal regulation. 198 FIRRMA
mandates declarations for covered transactions that would result in the
acquisition of a “substantial interest” in a U.S. business by a foreign entity
in which a foreign government directly or indirectly has a “substantial
interest.” 199 To illustrate, if Foreign Company A has a foreign government as
a major creditor, perhaps a 20% stock purchase of U.S. Company B by
Foreign Company A would require a CFIUS declaration filing. 200
FIRRMA leaves the task of defining the term “substantial interest” to
the Committee and permits the Committee to require mandatory
declarations for any covered transactions. 201 Exercising this authority
would multiply the number of filings that CFIUS reviews and thus could

Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 2184–2186 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)).
197 See e.g., Leiterlvan, supra note 179.
198 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 2184 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(II)); see also
Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51325 (Oct. 11, 2018) (describing what information must be
included in declarations).
199 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 2185 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(AA)).
200 Nothing in the statute suggests this hypothetical 20% ownership interest qualifies as
substantial, however corporate law requirements indicate that 20% is a generally accepted
level indicating significance. For example, for the issue of “substantial” dilution, when
the number of new shares issued exceeds 20% of currently issued shares, the issuance
requires shareholder approval. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f)(1)(ii) (1969) (Am. Bar
Ass’n, revised 2016).
201 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
132 Stat. 2184–86 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)).
196
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increase the number of delayed transactions. 202 On October 10, 2018, the
Treasury Department released its pilot program requiring that at least
forty-five days prior to the closing date of a transaction covered by the pilot
program, the parties must either (a) file the new declaration form to allow
the Committee to determine if a full notice must be subsequently filed, or
(b) file full notice with the Committee. 203 If a party’s transaction triggers a
mandatory declaration but the party fails to file, it may owe a civil monetary
penalty up to the value of the transaction. 204
See e.g., Farhad Jalinous et al., CFIUS Reform Becomes Law: What FIRRMA Means for
Industry, WHITE & CASE LLP (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/
publications/alert/cfius-reform-becomes-law-what-firrma-means-industry (discussing
the importance of CFIUS’ regulations yet to be determined).
203 See Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51325 (Oct. 11, 2018); Latham & Watkins, CFIUS Pilot
Program Makes Notifications Mandatory for Specific Areas of Critical Technology, LATHAM &
WATKINS CLIENT ALERT (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lwcfius-pilot-program-makes-notifications-mandatory-for-specific-areas-of-criticaltechnology.
204 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2185 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(g));
Interim Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 51322 (Oct. 11, 2018). CFIUS can now elect to implement
filing fees to supplement government funding for its expanding operations. FIRRMA
granted CFIUS a $20 million annual budget until 2023. See Foreign Investment Risk
Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2204 (2018)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(p)(2)). FIRRMA sets forth two criteria for the
amount of any filing fee: (1) the fee may not exceed 1% of the transaction value; and (2)
may not exceed $300,000. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of
2018, as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2204 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
4565(p)(3)(B)(i)). Though $300,000 would be crippling to a small business, it is unlikely
that a small business would engage in a transaction valued over $30,000,000 and avoid
triggering the first criterion. Additionally, FIRRMA requires CFIUS to conduct a study
to determine the feasibility and merits of a Prioritization Fee in exchange for faster
comments from the committee. See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act
of 2018, as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2205 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 4565(p)(3)(D)). The concept of premium pricing for priority government services is
not new; examples include one-day passport application processing, priority shipping
through the United States Postal Service, and TSA precheck at airport security. From a
policy perspective, this is a conduct specific tax serving a valid purpose. However, like
the increased duration of review periods, imposing fees will add to the total transaction
costs. Importantly, filing fees pose a danger by deterring otherwise compliant parties from
filing voluntary notices for review. Not all transactions are subject to mandatory
declarations, only those specified by the CFIUS committee through federal regulations
to come. Parties to CFIUS covered transactions that are not subject to the mandatory
filing will retain the option of filing notice with CFIUS. These parties will weigh the now
202
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This change is effective but inefficient. Prior to mandatory filings,
parties to a transaction threatening national security could possibly evade
pre-closing regulatory review by strategically choosing not to file for CFIUS
review. Although retroactive review always remained available, the damage
associated with transfer of proprietary intellectual property is irreversible:
there is no remedy for already-gleaned knowledge. By requiring
particularly problematic transactions to file an initial declaration
document, CFIUS can more effectively prevent irreparable harm caused by
disclosing the nation’s most promising intellectual advancements.
Nevertheless, the CFIUS regime has only retroactively blocked deals on the
most problematic transactions. These are the same transactions where the
parties are most likely to know CFIUS would take interest in the deal and
have historically chosen to voluntarily file CFIUS notice as a condition to
closing and thus avoid spontaneous government interference after the
deal’s termination date. In conclusion, to catch deals that would have
otherwise chosen not to file notice, the Committee will likely broaden the
number of covered transactions that must file mandatory declarations.
The benefits derived from eliminating CFIUS’ dependency on voluntary
action or tipping from media coverage and SEC filings is outweighed by
the likelihood of litigation 205 and possible delay in CFIUS decisions on
triggering transactions due to the strain to review filings from this
mandatory preliminary stage.
ii. Timing
FIRRMA expands the duration of the CFIUS review process. First,
CFIUS is granted ten business days to respond to the declaration. 206 The
increased transaction costs of filing—FIRRMA added fees, FIRRMA added timing
delays, and the previously existing potential for government restrictions that may have
otherwise been avoided—against the previously established benefit of a “safe harbor”
from retroactive investigation if approval is granted. FIRRMA increases the costs of
filing and therefore shifts an otherwise equal balancing of benefits toward the decision
to not file for CFIUS review voluntarily. The relative impact of this negative externality
will depend on the committee’s ultimate criteria for transactions subject to mandatory
filing. There is a risk that this pending criterion will not capture a transaction posing a
threat to national security. As a result, any additional deterrence of voluntarily filing
should be avoided.
205 Additionally, the mandatory nature of this stage will reopen Fifth Amendment
arguments raised in Ralls Corp. See infra Part II(C).
206 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, 132 Stat. 2178–88 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(i)(II)(aa)).
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full review now lasts forty- five days followed by a forty-five day
investigation period, if necessary. 207 In the case of “extraordinary
circumstance,” the Committee may extend this review period by an
additional fifteen days. 208 Lastly, FIRRMA grants the President fifteen days
to make a final determination. 209 In the aggregate, this amounts to the
possibility that the CFIUS process will last 115 days from the initial
declaration filing to the final determination.
On its surface, this change is a significant increase from the seventyfive day allotment under FINSA. However, the Committee under FINSA
regularly forced parties to withdraw and refile if they failed to complete
their review within the statutory allotment. For example, under FINSA, a
party could be forced to wait 150 days in total because a refiling would
restart the clock for Committee review. 210 FIRRMA intends to stop the
practice of forced refiling by mandating that the Committee file a

Id.
See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1709, 132 Stat. 1635, 2187–88 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b).
Note that within this forty-five to sixty day window is the thirty day period allotted to the
Director of National Intelligence to conduct his own investigation. See Foreign
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1712,
132 Stat. 1635, 2189 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(4)(1)(A).
209 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1714, 132 Stat. 1635, 2191 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(2) (2018)).
210 Covington & Burling LLP summarizes the FIRRMA change to the review period as
follows:
As a result, a single complete CFIUS review process potentially could
take as long as 105 days, [this does not include the 10 business days
the Committee has to respond to the initial declaration filing] as
opposed to 75 days under current law. That said, the 15-day extension
also could shorten somewhat the overall timeframe for those
transactions that currently must be withdrawn and refiled if CFIUS
has not completed its review within the initial 75 days. Those
transactions today generally are subject to a second full 75-day process,
for a total of 150 days, whereas the 15-day extension could permit at
least some such transactions to be completed without the need for a
refiling.
Covington & Burling LLP, CFIUS Update: FIRRMA Finalized, Nears Passage, COVINGTON
NEWS AND INSIGHTS (Jul. 25, 2018), https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/
insights/2018/07/cfius-update-firrma-finalized-nears-passage.
207
208
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Congressional report of incidents involving excess duration that explains
the reason for delay. 211
Nevertheless, in the aggregate this increase in the normal duration of
the CFIUS review process will likely increase transaction costs. The
detailed nature of both the information CFIUS requires to be disclosed in
the notice filings and the information the Committee can request
throughout the investigation period makes it unlikely that parties could
evade delays by filing before completing due diligence and negotiations. 212
Time is a valuable resource parties try to conserve throughout the
transaction to avoid excessive transaction costs. Additionally, other
regulatory hurdles, like antitrust clearance from the DOJ and FTC, often
take CFIUS clearance into consideration. Thus, the delay from CFIUS can
cause even further delay in the government approval process. 213 By
increasing the time needed to close transactions, it is highly likely that
FIRRMA raises the threshold of synergistic value needed to make a
rational deal.
iii. Committee Action
FIRRMA enables the Committee to suspend a proposed or pending
action. 214 Prior to this shift, CFIUS only stopped transactions once the
President made a determination, though parties were free to amend their
agreements to push their respective closing dates. This amendment to the
CFIUS procedure is beneficial because it allows CFIUS to prevent
irreparable harm that would otherwise occur if the transaction closed.
This may be necessary, for example, in cases with significant technical
know-how involved because the damage from the transfer of intellectual
property is unable to be reversed. 215 The Committee’s authority to
See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1719, 132 Stat. 1635, 2197 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(m)).
212 See Peter Thomas et al., A Primer on CFIUS: Navigating the Evolving U.S. National Security
Foreign Investment Review Process, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Jun. 2018), https://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/multimedia/antitrust_law/jun18_thomas_6_21f.pdf.
213 See id.
214 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1718, 132 Stat. 1635, 2193 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)).
215 This characteristic of intellectual property is demonstrated by the frequency at which
courts grant preliminary injunctions in IP misappropriation cases. See e.g., Gilliam v. Am.
Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976).
211
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temporarily stop a transaction for the duration of the CFIUS investigation
is the most explicit evidence of the Committee acting on the President’s
behalf. Unfortunately, though this change is beneficial in achieving its
intended outcome, the entanglement of executive action could potentially
give rise to constitutional problems with judicial review and transparency
that may make these benefits too costly for the CFIUS regime to
implement. 216
C. Judicial Review and Transparency are Likely Unrealistic
On a final note, it is critical to acknowledge the continued issue of
judicial reviewability. FIRRMA explicitly allows for civil actions to be
brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 217 This change to the legislation creates the illusion that parties
can bring suits to challenge CFIUS, but this ability is severely limited.
While it is true that the possibility of Committee action being subject to
judicial review could incentivize nonarbitrary decisions and better
awareness of Due Process standards, actual litigation will remain a rare
occurrence. 218
Unfortunately for parties, the President’s reasoning is still not subject
to judicial review; parties can only challenge final decisions by the
President on constitutional grounds. 219 Recall that the restrictions applied
in Ralls Corp; FIRRMA does not give grounds to reevaluate this
precedent. 220 For the parties seeking recourse, this likely means that the
ultimate outcome of their case will remain unaltered despite filing a civil
action as the statute permits because the CFIUS structure leaves the final
See infra Part II(C).
See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1715, 132 Stat. 1635, 2191 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2));
Joseph G. Falcone et al., President Trump Expands CFIUS Jurisdiction and Powers,
LEXOLOGY (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c1f
33256-f90b-4f65-a9a4-f3b83c2a6254.
218 See Wakely & Indorf, supra note 43, at 38. Though this article was written prior to the
passing of the new FIRRMA law and therefore was based on the Senate’s version of the
proposed bill, the concern over judicial reviewability applies to the newly enacted
legislation as well.
219 See Leiter et al., supra note 179 (“FIRRMA does not eliminate the existing prohibition
against judicial review of presidential actions and findings resulting from CFIUS cases
. . . .”).
220 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
216
217
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determination to the discretion of the President. Realistically, a suit will
probably incur further unwanted fees associated with the failed transaction
and still leave the practical result of the deal unchanged.
Additionally, access to information remains limited. The issue with the
government labeling more documents as classified—which may otherwise
have been categorized as unclassified—remains intact under Executive
Order 13,526. 221 The need to preserve indications of the President’s
opinion on matters of foreign affairs and national security as the President
sees fit likely trumps the value of general transparency. 222
FIRRMA makes clear that even in successful cases, only the judge will
have access to privileged information. 223 Section 1715 allows the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to consider classified or otherwise confidential
evidence on the condition that review occurs on an ex parte basis and in
camera. 224 Delegating CFIUS cases to this particular court makes sense
because some judges on this circuit have experience sitting on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review which already hears cases
involving information that is sensitive to national security. 225 Nevertheless,
See id. at 319; Exec. Order No. 13,526, 3 C.F.R. § 13526 (2010) (allowing significant
delegation of classification authority and broad classification categories, which include
“foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States.”). See generally Dep’t of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (discussing presidential “authority to classify and
control access to information bearing on national security”).
222 There is a utility curve of the amount of information kept proprietary. Some scholars
express opposing views that government transparency has become excessive. See e.g.,
Christina E. Wells, Administrative Law Discussion Forum: “National Security” Information and
the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2004) (“Although officials
often have credible and legitimate reasons to keep national security information secret,
government secrecy initiatives have invariably expanded to encompass information
beyond their initial rationale.”).
223 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, as part of the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115232, § 1715, 132 Stat. 1635, 2191 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(3)).
221

224

Id.
To handle disputes related to The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),
Congress established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1803 (2015). The three D.C. Circuit judges, delegated by the Chief Justice of the United
States, who currently sit on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review are
Honorable Judges Cabranes, Sentelle, and Tallman. See U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVELLANCE ACT., https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/fiscr_membership (last visited Sept.
1, 2019); see also Nelson Dong et al., Greater Scrutiny on Foreign Inbound Investments: Update
on the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, DORSEY & WITNEY LLP
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/
2018/08/foreign-investment-risk-review- modernization-act (“Section 1715(4) expressly
225
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an adequate forum does not negate the need for parties to be afforded the
chance to be granted actual relief or at minimum, receive some form of
transparency. In reality, neither of these needs are met by FIRRMA’s
superficial attempt to increase judicial reviewability and transparency for
parties.
Aside from the specified forum, FIRRMA may have judicial
implications from the addition of mandatory declarations. Two excerpts
from the Ralls Corp opinion give an indication as to how the Judiciary will
likely interpret the change in mandatory filing and potential use of
executive privilege to maintain the secrecy of the review process. When
the court decided Ralls Corp, it differentiated the case based on the
voluntary choice to file notice with CFIUS by companies involved in the
transaction. 226 The court stated that failure to seek pre-approval did not
work as waiver “when the regulatory scheme expressly contemplates that a
party to a covered transaction may request approval—if the party decides
to submit a voluntary notice at all—either before or after the transaction is
completed.” 227 The court drew a distinction from the optional nature of
filing under FINSA. This permits the assumption that the shift to
mandatory filings under FIRRMA could reopen the courts to evaluate
Fifth Amendment Due Process implications.
Furthermore, Ralls Corp did not fully deliberate the issue of executive
privilege. 228
It remains undetermined whether executive privilege, by either the
executive communications prong or the deliberative process prong, will
successfully shield disclosure of even unclassified documents
considered. 229 Some scholars called for reform after the Ralls Corp
decision, arguing that only the Committee’s action, as an agency, should be
subject to procedural review like in the cases of Ralpho and Ungar on which
the Ralls Corp court relied. 230 This suggestion ignores the design of CFIUS
provides that the ‘use of information’ provisions in FISA will not apply to any civil action
brought to challenge a CFIUS ruling under Section 1715.”).
226 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296, 317 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(differentiating this case from Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) and Parker
v. Bd. of Regents of Tulsa Junior Coll., 981 F.2d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 1992)).
227
228

Id.

Id. at 320–21.
Id.; see generally Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d 296.
230 See, e.g., Christopher M. Fitzpatrick, Note, Where Ralls Went Wrong: CFIUS, The Courts,
and the Balance of Liberty and Security, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1087, 1100–01 (2016) (citing
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 613–15 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that an agency’s
229
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which intentionally blurs the line between executive agency and executive
office; however, under the new FIRRMA regulation, the agency side of
CFIUS gains significant power that could render this critique more
applicable. 231
D. Conclusion
Though the power of CFIUS may be better utilized under FIRRMA,
the issue of efficient use of this power remains unrealized. Historically,
the parties involved withdraw almost half of the transactions CFIUS
investigated rather than waiting for a potentially negative determination. 232
The significant increase in the number of covered transactions will
magnify this effect and lead to unintentional overdeterrence. The loss of
economically beneficial transactions that would not have posed a threat to
national security will ripple through the U.S. economy, impacting research
and development, employment, and general economic stability.
Additionally, FIRRMA leaves open the problematic “greenfield”
investment loophole, which could potentially allow foreign investors to
exploit the intellectual expertise on which the United States depends.
III. Proposed Solution
To successfully navigate the modern battleground of the global
marketplace, U.S. oversight regulations must strategically address the
nation’s intertwined economic and national security objectives. While
FIRRMA addresses several leading concerns of today, it expands CFIUS
to a point of excess and will not be able to efficiently achieve its goals.
CFIUS should be respected as a pivotal element imbedded in a larger,
wholistic strategy rather than as the sole gatekeeper watching for a range
of problematic commerce. CFIUS should be expanded by increasing
resources needed to handle an already large volume of cases. But even
determination using secretive evidence was unfair to the claimant entitled to an
opportunity to meet the evidence considered); Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188, 197–98
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (reviewing only constitutional claims against the agency’s procedural
mechanisms for determining the Hungarian corporation’s property rights after World
War II).
231 See supra Part II(a)(iii).
232 See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, The Committee on Foreign
Investment on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 57 (2016) (referencing
the Israeli firm Check Point Software Technologies’ decision to terminate negotiations
to purchase American firm Sourcefire for $225 million).
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with an increased budget to expand, a new and improved CFIUS is only
part of a larger regulatory structure needed to address the complex
balance between economically beneficial but tactically concerning foreign
investment in U.S. technology, real estate, and infrastructure. 233
First, an amendment to FIRRMA is necessary. Personal data concerns
should be addressed as a separate issue independent from CFIUS. Second,
CFIUS should be supported by other legislative changes. Financial
regulation must authorize the SEC to require investment funds to disclose
their lists of all investors including limited partners. Third, the Committee
must pass regulations that ease the process for parties to avoid stifling the
economy and the innovation it drives.
A. Amendments to CFIUS: Data
The issue of personal data protection deserves to be addressed on its
own merit. CFIUS cannot be tasked with the responsibility of addressing
all current concerns. When overextended, CFIUS will not be able to
review FDI transactions efficiently and adequately. Congress ought to
amend FIRRMA by striking the provision that triggers CFIUS review over
foreign investments resulting in foreign access to the sensitive personal data
of U.S. citizens.
Instead, like the European Union, the United States should pass its
own version of the GDPR. This separate bill could then address breaches
of personal data that have no connection to FDI. Specifically, the bill
should adopt measures to ensure American companies, and any
companies that may be domiciled abroad but still collect the data of
American citizens, implement adequate safeguards to prevent the theft of
such information.
If passed, this amendment would reduce the number of covered
transactions.
Additionally, this solution will eliminate the need for the Committee to
further define what data qualifies as “sensitive” and “personal.” An
overburdened CFIUS regulatory regime is equally as concerning as gaps in
review coverage. FIRRMA should enable CFIUS to operate in an efficient
manner, one that promotes both comprehensive reviews of FDI when
national security is threated and economic fluidity when transactions do
not.

233

See Greenberg Center, supra note 167.
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B. Support From Outside:
SEC Investor Disclosures and Startup Funding Disclosures
i. Passive Investment Still Poses a Threat
The culmination of passive investment by foreign nationals stands to
expose the U.S. economy to vulnerabilities. The Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC) can ease the difficulty of identifying individuals who
participate in investment funds like those discussed in Part II which are
currently awarded the investment fund carveout. In an effort to increase
transparency, the SEC should pass a new regulation mandating all forms
of investment funds to maintain accurate records of their current
beneficiaries. Adequate record keeping should identify the name,
investment size, proportion of the fund attributed to the investment, and
the citizenship status of each investor. The SEC should then require
companies whose sum of foreign investors reaches a determined threshold
of magnitude or percentage of the fund to file the fund’s records with the
SEC. This regulation would give CFIUS the necessary ability to determine
who the investment funds truly represent, take this knowledge into
consideration during its review and investigation process, and if it deems
necessary, expand the “other [covered] transactions” section to include
investments made by investment funds that meet certain criteria the
Committee deems problematic.
ii. Startup Structure Reporting
Legislators must stop the flow of FDI going into technology startups
without being subject to CFIUS review. The most efficient way to
accomplish this would be if each individual state uniformly enacts an
additional part to their business registration requirements to stop
unchecked “greenfield” investments. These laws should require
companies to disclose all investors, the amount of their investments, and
their citizenship status in order to legally conduct business in the state.
This solution uses a registration process that is already in place to share
knowledge which businesses already have access to, at little to no
additional costs to the state or federal government. At the very least, this
step would create a record for CFIUS and Congress to analyze. If
Congress found that the intellectual property associated with these
startups overlap with the category of critical technology, further steps
could be taken. Federalism bars such a sweeping requirement on state
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governments; Congress likely cannot force this simple solution upon the
states without “commandeering” state legislatures in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. 234 Universal concern over the issues present could
nevertheless drive states to pass their own versions of such a reporting
standard, but full enactment by all fifty states is likely too optimistic.
Unfortunately, to gather this information it is likely necessary for Congress
to make a separate federal establishment of business entity registration
form. 235 In taking additional measures to shelter American technology and
know-how from foreign nationals, legislators should consider the risk of
banning foreign investment into new ventures against the possible cost to
innovation should that funding supply suddenly evaporate.
C. Regulations Inside CFIUS: Definitions
One of FIRRMA’s strengths is its design to allow the experts, the
Committee, to further establish specific federal regulations to implement
the law’s intended changes. The Treasury department stated that FIRRMA
will reach full implementation no later than February 2020 after the
completion of the pilot program. 236 To best capitalize on this opportunity
and avoid overbreadth issues that could cause a chilling effect on
investment, CFIUS should consider adding regulations to clarify what
transactions trigger the “critical technologies” review.
It is well-documented that in some industries, companies tend to patent
innovations in order to protect their commercial value. 237 Examples of this
are frequently found in pharmaceutical and biotech companies. As a result,
the Committee could identify particular companies who hold patents that
indicate research and development into areas the DOD believes has the
potential to prove useful from a military standpoint. By targeting
companies rather than entire industry sectors, the number of covered
transactions could be greatly reduced. Nevertheless, for industries where
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Congress could argue that this action is supported by the Commerce Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
236 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Interim Regulations for
FIRRMA Pilot Program, (Oct. 10, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm506.
237 See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1278 (2009)
(“[T]he incidence and usefulness of patents to technology entrepreneurs is very much
determined by the industry and technology in which the company is operating.”).
234
235
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trade secret protection is used as an alternative to filing patents, the
Committee will need to stick to industry wide identification. The NAICS
codes used in the pilot program appear to be a useful tool; however, it
should be noted that businesses self-identify for these classifications.
The Committee should urgently implement Federal Regulation that
defines “influence” specifically. By defining the currently vague term
through exact situations and numeric criteria, parties can be clear when
CFIUS review should be initiated and when their filing of notice would
only hinder valid inquiries into other transactions. The Committee can
apply the long-recognized value behind bright line rules in unrelated legal
precedent to avoid overbreadth that would otherwise hinder positive
economic activity and distract resources from transactions in need of
oversight.
An additional means of transferring intellectual property across
borders that is not addressed by CFIUS is the labor market. Non-compete
agreements and trade secret law are unlikely to preserve proprietary
information being used in jurisdictions outside the United States. This
fight over the right to work freely between individuals and the companies
who invest in their employees is seen in the current debate over the social
value and public policy arguments for and against the use of non-compete
agreements. As long as public policy favors the freedom of individuals to
earn a living in their prospective fields of expertise, then all the essential
information FIRRMA seeks to protect could be transferred through the
medium of minds without the scrutiny of CFIUS review. The mobility of
individuals in their occupations has undeniable value by giving individuals
autonomy. Nevertheless, the poaching of America’s best minds does pose
a real threat to national security that should be considered.
It has been assumed that the benefits an individual derives from living
in the United States outweigh any monetary incentives companies abroad
may offer, but perhaps this assumption nears the end of its utility as the
rise of greed plagues modern society. Ideally, a sense of national loyalty
within the individuals who have such critical proprietary knowledge would
limit any potentially problematic intellectual property transfer across
borders; however, this may no longer be the case as the increasingly global
economy continues to give rise to a sense of global citizenship. Regardless
of the rationale behind the decisions of business leaders, the need for
oversight of FDI is clear and CFIUS will need to pass further regulations
to ensure they adequately and efficiently review transactions.
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IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the proposed changes regarding the removal of data as
a triggering transaction component, the Committee’s defining of “critical
technologies” and “influence,” and the SEC regulation to track passive
investment will condense the far reaching implications of the new CFIUS
regime under FIRRMA and maximize efficiency to encourage investment
into the American economy without hindering genuine concerns over
national security. Today, with the rise of the global market and military
dependence on private sector innovation, it is the duty of the elected
officials of the Unites States to achieve the precise balance between
protecting the nation from problematic FDI and ensuring economic
investment continues to incentivize the innovation that protects the
country. FIRRMA fails to achieve this critical balance because it is neither
sufficient in protecting national security interests nor efficient in
preserving economic incentives.

